The CJEU and the Introduction of International Dispute Settlement Mechanisms within the EU: Is Alternative Dispute Resolution in the EU in safe hands?
Bibliographic record
Abstract
This article draws upon the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) concerning the role of the international dispute settlement mechanisms operating within the EU legal order. The Court has resisted the introduction of such dispute settlement mechanisms, referring to Articles 267 and 344 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) as justifications for its ‘judicial monopoly’. The Achmea case in particular allows the Court declaring these dispute settlement mechanisms as contrary to EU law. However, with the Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement (CETA) Opinion, the Court itself has permitted the CETA Investment Court to be compatible with EU law, within the Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement (CETA) with Canada. This leads to the possibility that the Court’s reasoning should be equally applicable to other potential investment courts. The present article is a doctrinal study; which examined primary sources of EU law namely the Treaties and the CJEU’s jurisprudence within international commercial and investment law. It is argued that there are ‘winds of change’ within the EU legal order as the EU legal order begins to readily adopt such dispute settlement mechanisms. This is visible through the approval of the CETA Investment Court, coexisting with debates on developing a permanent multilateral court within the EU legal order and following Brexit the use of arbitration within the EU and UK trade agreements. However, at the same time these advancements are to be taken with caution because the recent developments within the UK EU trade agreements illustrate that the CJEU may still be keen to protect its ‘exclusive jurisdiction’ under the Treaties.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.033 | 0.055 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.003 | 0.004 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.009 | 0.038 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.036 | 0.030 |
| Open science | 0.003 | 0.010 |
| Research integrity | 0.023 | 0.018 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.005 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".