The proliferation security initiative and United Nations Security Resolution 1540: international law and the world's recent efforts to combat proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Efforts to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have existed ever since the first WMD were created.In recent years, the proliferation of WMD has been recognized as a threat to international peace and security.The recognition of this threat led to recent efforts by the international community to create two new mechanisms for combating the proliferation of WMD.The new mechanisms are the Proliferation Security Initiative and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540.These new mechanisms were instituted to fill gaps in the existing nonproliferation regime, though they approach nonproliferation by different methods.One utilizes a small voluntary coalition, while the other imposes mandatory obligations of a universal nature.Both were created through international legal methods, but arguably exist due to novel legal authorities.Their bases in international law will be crucial to their effectiveness in the nonproliferation regime.If they do not adhere to existing international law and comport with the existing nonproliferation regime, then their success in combating WMD proliferation will be limited.This thesis provides background on the nonproliferation regime and these two recent mechanisms and then analyzes their adherence to international law.I then argue that in order for a WMD non-proliferation instrument to be successful, it must comport with international law.In this respect, Resolution 1540 may be superior to The Proliferation Security Initiative. RésuméDepuis l'apparition des toutes premières armes de destruction massive (ADM), des efforts sont déployés pour contrer leur prolifération.Depuis quelques années, il est reconnu que la prolifération des ADM constitue une menace envers la paix et la sécurité internationale.La reconnaissance de cette menace a incité la communauté internationale à créer deux nouveaux mécanismes pour combattre la prolifération des ADM, soit l'Initiative de sécurité contre la prolifération et la résolution 1540 du Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU.Ces mécanismes ont été mis en place pour combler les lacunes présentes dans le régime de non-prolifération, mais ils abordent la non-prolifération à l'aide de méthodes différentes.Le premier se fonde sur une petite coalition de volontaires, tandis que l'autre impose des obligations à teneur universelle.Les deux mécanismes ont été créés à l'aide de moyens juridiques internationaux, mais on peut considérer qu'ils existent en fait depuis l'émergence de nouvelles autorités légales.Leur enracinement dans le droit international sera crucial pour assurer leur efficacité au sein du régime de non-prolifération.Si ces mécanismes ne se conforment pas au droit international et qu'ils concordent avec le régime de non-prolifération actuel, leur efficacité pour contrer la prolifération des ADM sera restreinte.La présente thèse propose une étude des fondements du régime de non-prolifération et de ces deux nouveaux mécanismes, pour ensuite analyser leur conformité respective au droit international.Je soumet ensuite que pour assurer le succès d'un instrument contre la prolifération des armes de destruction massive, il faudra que cet instrument se conforme au droit international.Sur cette considération, la resolution 1540 de l'ONU est peut-être bien superieur a l'Initiative de sécurité contre la prolifération.
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.011 | 0.015 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.007 | 0.013 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.017 | 0.007 |
| Open science | 0.002 | 0.005 |
| Research integrity | 0.013 | 0.011 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.009 | 0.002 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".