Who makes the rules? : why the United States succeeds or fails in shaping the global\n agenda
Why this work is in the frame
A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Thesis (Ph.D.)--Georgetown University, 2010.; Includes bibliographical\n references.; Text (Electronic thesis) in PDF format. Among other characteristics, one facet of\n the unipolar world that clearly differentiates it from previous eras is the degree to which\n interactions between states are increasingly institutionalized. While the United States\n continues to play an integral role in the formation of new agreements, a variety of global\n institutions have been established in recent years in the face of opposition from the United\n States. Though the literature on institutional formation is rich and diverse, much of it\n suggests that the formation of institutions in the face of opposition from the world's most\n powerful state should be highly unlikely. As such, the existence of\n "outliers" suggests that existing theoretical paradigms on institutional\n formation may need to be reassessed and reapplied to better take the dynamics of unipolarity\n into account. How do institutions form in the face of hegemonic opposition? Why has the United\n States lost control over the agenda in many post cold-war international treaty negotiations?\n What were the tipping points that changed the negotiation dynamics? Where, when and how could\n the United States have intervened to alter the outcome? What are the implications for\n international relations theory and practice? This dissertation attempts to shed light on these\n and other related questions.; Drawing on descriptive quantitative data and a range of case\n studies including the Ottawa Treaty on Landmines, Kyoto Protocol and International Criminal\n Court, this dissertation tests a theoretical model aimed at explaining the post-Cold War\n emergence of global international institutions that do not reflect the United States'\n preferences. The results of the case studies suggest that a variety of factors including\n ineffective diplomacy, changes in the structure of the international system and the emergence\n of new methods of institutional formation have ultimately led to the creation of institutions\n that the United States opposes. These findings have important implications for international\n relations theory and practice.
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.003 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.002 | 0.001 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.001 | 0.003 |
| Open science | 0.003 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.002 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it