How do nations control political finance and why do reforms occur? A nested mixed-method analysis of political finance reform in Canada, New Zealand, and Commonwealth Caribbean small states

This thesis aims to provide a greater understanding of how nations regulate political finance and why reforms occur. To compare models of regulation, the first stage of the thesis develops the ‘Regulation of Political Finance Indicator’ (RoPFI). Starting with the 2020 iteration of International IDEA’s ‘Political Finance Database’, Multiple Correspondence Analysis is used to construct a variable on which to measure levels of regulation across 180 nations. Subsequently, Model Based Clustering identifies the ‘Unregulated’, ‘Partially Regulated’ and ‘Strongly Regulated’ types of political finance system, and provides a statistical measure of the certainty of each nation’s classification. Using the RoPFI to assess global trends, findings indicate that small states of the Caribbean and Pacific have the fewest regulations on political finance, while nations of Central and Eastern Europe, the Middle East and North African (MENA) region, and the Americas employ the strictest controls in this area. The remainder of this thesis examines political finance reform in a group of Westminster democracies, namely Canada, New Zealand, and a sample of seven small states from the Commonwealth Caribbean (The Bahamas, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent & The Grenadines). Studies use Zim Nwokora’s ‘General Theory of Campaign Finance Reform’ as a foundation upon which to examine why reforms occur. Distinguishing between loosening and tightening reforms, the model suggests that the reform process is guided by shifts in party competition, party organization strength, and ideological factors. Scandals and changes in incumbency are also suggested as junctures that may prompt reform. To test the projections of this model, Hansard is used to document Parliamentary interactions on political finance, and operationalized indicators of party competition, organization, and ideology are used to trace the context within which discussions took place. Findings indicate that variations in levels of party competition and party organization strength are influential in shaping political finance reform, while ideological factors are much less so. Scandals are found to be influential in the passage of tightening reforms, while changes in incumbency are identified as a poor predictor in this area. Building on these observations, the final case study – focused on small states of the Commonwealth Caribbean – finds that the endurance of clientelism in the region continue to act as a barrier to political finance reform. This relationship is exemplified in a detailed case study of failed reform attempts in Saint Lucia and, subsequently, a link between practice in small and large states is identified. The differentiation between governance approaches – where small states are more likely to trend toward clientelism, relative to larger states – is identified as the causal mechanism that underpins this observation. Taking this into consideration, the thesis concludes with an updated theoretical model of political finance reform. To summarize, scandals are presented as critical junctures in the passage of tighter regulations. Beyond this, variations in governance model type, levels of competition, and the strength of party organizations are the main factors that influence the direction of the reform process. This thesis makes contributions in methodological, empirical, and theoretical terms. Methodologically, the development of the RoPFI provides a key resource for scholars of political finance. In empirical terms, the RoPFI represents one of the first global measures of political finance to consider all areas of regulation – both from the party and candidate perspectives – and also incorporates some of the least studied regions in this area, namely the Caribbean and the Pacific. Theoretical contributions span numerous areas of research. Primarily, the theoretical model developed in this thesis broadens understanding of the origins of political finance regulation, by addressing inconsistencies in prior literature. The identification of clientelism as a barrier to reform, particularly within the small state context, contributes to knowledge on the implications of clientelist governance models, as well as institutional development in small states.

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