Towards a New World for Investor-State Arbitration through Transparency
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Alfred Tennyson wrote in his stirring poem Ulysses, “Come my friends. 'Tis not too late to seek a newer world.” Commentators similarly have been calling for a type of new world for investor-state arbitration through greater transparency. The 2014 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Rules on Transparency represent a major milestone in realizing that new world, with the 2015 United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration (Mauritius Convention) following closely on its heels in terms of timing and content. It remains to be seen whether the Transparency Rules and the Mauritius Convention will achieve their desired goals of bringing genuine transparency to the field of investor-state arbitration, especially since strong forces oppose such changes. By identifying and analyzing the ways that states have incorporated—and more importantly, failed to incorporate—provisions on transparency in their international investment agreements prior to the Transparency Rules and the Mauritius Convention, this Article shows the progressive nature of these two instruments. Indeed, the main core of transparency in investor-state arbitration emerged in the context of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and has been further advanced by such states as Canada and the United States. However, what this Article identifies as the NAFTA acquis on transparency largely has not been adopted by many of the thousands of international investment treaties now in existence. By highlighting the flaws within the Transparency Rules and Mauritius Convention, this Article cautiously predicts that these instruments will not have the dramatic impact on investor-state arbitration that one might have hoped for in the future.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.054 | 0.057 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.008 | 0.031 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.025 | 0.038 |
| Open science | 0.002 | 0.014 |
| Research integrity | 0.016 | 0.033 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.006 | 0.002 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".