Implicações no emprego das capacidades do Sistema de Forças Nacional
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Os novos teatros de operações, designadamente do Afeganistão, voltaram a confrontar os militares com o problema da guerra contra-subversiva, agora denominada operações de Counterinsurgency (COIN). Este tipo de operações obriga a uma nova dinâmica cuja presença de múltiplos actores civis e militares torna a cooperação Civil-Militar (CIMIC) uma ferramenta essencial no planeamento, na conduta e na coordenação das operações militares. Neste momento, a doutrina COIN está em processo de ratificação no seio da OTAN, o que sugere também uma necessária reflexão para que seja actualizada a doutrina da CIMIC. De facto, a luta contra a subversão não se pode fazer apenas com unidades militares, uma vez que a complexidade do ambiente operacional exige uma abordagem mais ampla e abrangente. Nas COIN, a função CIMIC desempenha um papel central, permitindo o interface entre as forças militares e os diversos actores civis intervenientes neste tipo de cenário. A nível nacional, Portugal assumiu o compromisso internacional com a OTAN para disponibilizar uma unidade CIMIC. O emprego da capacidade CIMIC nas COIN pode ter implicações que interessa avaliar e analisar, para que sejam encontradas as respostas a uma operacionalidade efectiva e total. Neste trabalho, propomo-nos, encontrar na doutrina CIMIC os factores que podem ser utilizados numa análise que irá também recorrer a uma base experimental, materializada pelo estudo de dois casos de CIMIC no Afeganistão, nomeadamente o caso canadiano e o caso francês. Tendo em consideração a informação retirada destes estudos de caso e utilizando os factores identificados na doutrina OTAN, poderemos analisar as capacidades do Sistema de Forças Nacional, no âmbito da CIMIC, e verificar quais as implicações do emprego da capacidade CIMIC nas COIN. Conseguimos apurar que, enquadrada nas COIN, a função CIMIC permite estabelecer o contacto com a população para que sejam avaliadas as suas necessidades. A função CIMIC colabora directamente na estratégia de conquista dos “corações e das mentes”, contribuindo assim para as COIN. Nestas operações, as unidades CIMIC devem possuir um nível apropriado de Protecção da Força para manter a sua intervenção permanente e contínua. A segurança constitui um pilar fundamental para que a população se sinta protegida e para que a sua economia seja revitalizada. Para apoiar a intervenção das unidades CIMIC, constatou-se que os Quick Impact Projects eram uma ferramenta indispensável e eficaz. Concluímos, então, que a capacidade CIMIC do Sistema de Forças Nacional necessita de alguns ajustes para que possa apoiar eficazmente uma força militar nas operações COIN. O incremento de uma célula dedicada aos projectos e um aproveitamento de alguns elementos doutrinários e da experiência existente relativamente à guerra contra-subversiva durante a guerra colonial, permitirão o emprego da capacidade CIMIC nas COIN de forma eficiente e com a necessária adaptabilidade. Abstract: The new theater of operations, including Afghanistan, returned to confront the military with the problem of counter-subversive war, now named Counterinsurgency operations (COIN). This type of operation requires a new dynamic and the presence of multiple civilian and military actors, makes the Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) an essential tool in the planning, conduct and coordination of military operations. The COIN doctrine is currently undergoing ratification within NATO, which also suggests a reflection about the need of CIMIC doctrine update. The fight against the insurgency can not be done only with military units, the complexity of the operational environment requires a broader approach and understanding. The CIMIC function in COIN, plays an important role, allowing the interface between the military and various civilian actors involved in this type of scenario. With regard to the national case, Portugal is internationally committed with NATO to provide a CIMIC unit. The use of CIMIC capacity in COIN may have implications, that we have to evaluate and analyze, in order to find the answer to an effective and total operational response. We propose in this research, finding the doctrine CIMIC factors that can be used in an analysis which will also use an experimental basis, embodied by the study of two cases of CIMIC in Afghanistan, particularly the Canadian and French cases. Given the information taking these case studies and using the factors identified in the NATO doctrine, we can examine the capabilities of the National Forces System, as part of CIMIC, and see what the implications of the use of CIMIC capacity in COIN. We were able to establish that the CIMIC function in COIN allows the establishment of the contact with the population so that their needs are assessed. The CIMIC function works directly on strategy for winning the "hearts and minds", thus contributing to the COIN. In these operations, CIMIC units must have an appropriate level of Force Protection, to maintain its permanent and continuous intervention. Security is a fundamental pillar for people to feel protected and for a revitalized economy. We found that the Quick Impact Projects are an indispensable and an effective tool to support the intervention of CIMIC units. We can then conclude, that the CIMIC capability of the National Forces System needs some adjustments so that it can effectively support a military force in COIN operations. About the CIMIC unit, the increase of a cell dedicated to projects and the recovery of some elements of doctrine and experience that still exists regarding the insurgency during the colonial war, will allow the efficient use of CIMIC capacity in COIN and with the necessary adaptability.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.006 | 0.011 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.004 | 0.005 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.011 | 0.007 |
| Open science | 0.002 | 0.005 |
| Research integrity | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.032 | 0.003 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".