Public Choice Issues in Collective Action: Global Warming Treaty Negotiation and Compliance
Bibliographic record
Abstract
"There is a large and growing body of literature on scientific issues and regulatory instruments, such as emissions permits, in international efforts to control greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The underlying collective action issues have received much less attention. In particular, the bargaining problem among sovereign states, the associated public choice problem within negotiating countries, and the implications for agreement and sustained compliance have been neglected. This paper examines the problems of international cooperation when the aggregate benefits and costs of the objective are uncertain; the corresponding net gains to bargaining parties are uncertain; when the parties are heterogeneous with respect to the distribution of benefits and costs; and when adherence to the agreement by sovereign states is voluntary. We outline a bargaining framework, including the public choice tradeoffs facing politicians, for analyzing international bargaining to address global common-property resource problems. We focus on the likely net gains from agreement for major negotiating countries and on politicians within industrial democracies, such as the US, and their decisions to respond to constituencies who support global agreements, constituencies harmed by them, and taxpayers who must fund transfers both to internal parties to compensate for treaty costs and to other countries as side payments for participating. We apply this framework to the Law of the Sea Treaty of 1982 (LOS), the Montreal Protocol to Control Substances that Damage the Ozone Layer of 1987, and the Kyoto Protocol of 1997. There are similar negotiation and compliance issues in all three collective actions. The analysis provides implications for the success of international efforts to control temperature change."
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.035 | 0.058 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.002 | 0.003 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.010 | 0.029 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.012 | 0.016 |
| Open science | 0.003 | 0.009 |
| Research integrity | 0.022 | 0.012 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.013 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".