Corporate governance in publicly-held companies: lessons for China’s companies limited by shares
Bibliographic record
Abstract
The thesis purports to address the current corporate governance in companies limited by shares in China, starting from a review of the theoretical debate between the contractual and legal regulatory theories in American corporate law scholarship. An optimal corporate governance should consists of a mix of mandatory corporate rules, markets and morality. The author argues that central to the debate is the balance between efficiency and fairness in reducing agency costs, which is contingent upon actual social circumstances. A review of Canadian corporate law and its literature is conducted from the perspective of corporate governance. Corporate statutes, securities acts and stock exchange polices are the foci in this study. The article concludes that the balance between directors' discretion in managing the company and accountability to shareholders should be presented in an optimal corporate governance. China's corporate laws and securities regulations have provided a governance frame, but left some loose ends to be refined. The author argues that China is following the North American experience which relies on the stock market and institutional investors in designing corporate governance, but suggests that cautions should be taken while addressing corporate governance in China with such a perspective. The state of stock markets and institutional investors in China does not justify too much optimism as to their significance in corporate governance. The intervention of the administrative organ authorised to oversee the stock market into corporate governance is necessary in light that laws and markets can not provide sufficient protection to shareholders.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.002 | 0.004 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Research integrity | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.002 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".