The Consequences of Cobenefits for the Efficient Design of Carbon Sequestration Programs', Canadian
Bibliographic record
Abstract
In this paper, we study the social efficiency of private carbonmarkets that include trading in agricultural soil carbon sequestration when there are significant cobenefits (positive environmental externalities) associated with the practices that sequester carbon. Likewise, we investigate the efficiency of govern-ment run conservation programs that are designed to promote a broad array of environmental attributes (both carbon sequestration and its cobenefits) for the supply of carbon. Finally, policy design and effi-ciency issues associated with the potential interplay between a private carbon market and a government conservation program are studied. Empirical analyses for an area that represents a significant potential source of carbon sequestration and its associated cobenefits illustrate the magnitude and complexity of these issues in real world policy design. Dans le présent article, nous avons examine ́ l’efficacite ́ sociale des marchés privés d’échange de droits d’émission de carbone y compris les échanges liés a ̀ la séquestration du carbone dans les sols agricoles lorsqu’il y a des avantages accessoires considérables (effets favorables sur l’environnement) associés aux pratiques qui permettent de séquestrer le carbone. Nous avons également analyse ́ l’efficacite ́ des programmes de conservation administrés par le gouvernement et conçus pour promouvoir diverses caractéristiques environnementales (dont la séquestration du carbone et ses avantages accessoires) pour l’offre du carbone. Finalement, nous avons examine ́ les problèmes de conception et d’efficacite ́ des politiques en présence d’interaction entre un marche ́ prive ́ d’échange de droits d’émission de carbone et un programme de conservation administre ́ par le gouvernement. Des analyses empiriques dans le cas d’une région qui représente une source considérable de séquestration du carbone et d’avantages accessoires ont illustre ́ l’importance et la complexite ́ des problèmes liés a ̀ la conception de politiques.
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.002 | 0.006 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.003 | 0.002 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.002 | 0.001 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Research integrity | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.006 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".