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Record W7097396412

Do Bidders in Canadian Treasury Bill Auctions Have Private Values?

2008· article· en· W7097396412 on OpenAlexaboutno aff

Bibliographic record

Venuenot available
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicAuction Theory and Applications
Canadian institutionsnot available
Fundersnot available
KeywordsTreasuryCommon value auctionValue (mathematics)Private information retrievalOrder (exchange)Transaction dataDatabase transaction
DOInot available

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

We exploit a unique feature of data from Canadian treasury bill auctions, in which some bidders have information about rivals’ bids, to develop a test if values are private. Information about a rival’s bid causes a bidder to bid differently when she has a private value than when her value depends on rivals ’ information. In a divisible good setting, such as treasury bill auctions, bidders with private values who obtain information about rivals ’ bids use this information only to update their prior about the distribution of residual supply. In the model with interdependent (or common) values, they also update their prior about the value of the good being auctioned. We use these differential updating effects to construct our test. We cannot reject the null hypothesis of private values in our data for 3-months treasury bills, but we reject private values for 12-months treasury bills. Furthermore, we use the estimated model to quantify the value of customer order flow to a dealer. We find that the extra information contained in customers’ bids leads on average to an increase in payoff equal to about 0.5 of a basis point, or 32 % of the expected surplus of dealers from participating in these auctions.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.001
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesInsufficient payload (model declined to judge)
Consensus categoriesInsufficient payload (model declined to judge)
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Observational · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.365
Threshold uncertainty score0.999

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.001
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0010.001
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0040.002

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.158
GPT teacher head0.378
Teacher spread0.221 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; both teacher heads agree on what is shown here.

Study designObservational
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations0
Published2008
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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