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Record W7099784102

Social Insurance and Redistribution with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection,” Scandinavian

2006· article· en· W7099784102 on OpenAlexaboutno aff

Bibliographic record

Venuenot available
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldBusiness, Management and Accounting
TopicLegal and Labor Studies
Canadian institutionsnot available
Fundersnot available
KeywordsMoral hazardSocial insuranceRedistribution (election)Morale hazardEconomic interventionismGeneral insuranceGovernment (linguistics)Key person insuranceIncome protection insurance
DOInot available

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

This paper studies the joint role of social insurance and redistributive taxation when the government has a utilitarian objective. We allow for private insurance to compete with social insurance with moral hazard and adverse selection. We show that government intervention in insurance markets can be welfare-improving. This depends on whether or not redistributive taxation generates a labour distortion and on the correlation between labour productivity and loss probability. We are grateful for comments by Louis Eeckhoudt, Gabrielle Demange and Roger Guesnerie, and to participants of the Canadian Public Economics Study Group 2001

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.000
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Observational · Consensus signal: Observational
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.065
Threshold uncertainty score0.224

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.007
GPT teacher head0.195
Teacher spread0.188 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designObservational
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations0
Published2006
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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