Multilingual Collaborative Defense for Large Language Models
Bibliographic record
Abstract
The robustness and security of Large Language Models (LLMs) face increasing threats, especially in multilingual settings. A notable vulnerability is “jailbreaking” via translating harmful queries into rare or underrepresented languages, which often bypasses existing safeguards. In this work, we propose Multilingual Collaborative Defense (MCD), a novel learning method that optimizes a continuous soft safety prompt automatically to facilitate multilingual safeguarding of LLMs. MCD organically leverages collaborative signals from multiple languages by rotating each as the training “center,” allowing auxiliary languages to reinforce safety prompt learning and ensuring cross‑lingual consistency. As a result, MCD improves defense performance across all languages, reduces false refusals, and mitigates safety misalignment caused by corpus imbalance. To evaluate MCD, we construct multilingual versions of jailbreak benchmarks such as MaliciousInstruct and AdvBench, including zero-shot languages, to assess language transferability. Experiments show that MCD outperforms prior approaches in multilingual jailbreak defense while exhibiting strong cross-lingual generalization. Our code is available at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/MCD-0519.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.006 | 0.019 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.002 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.002 | 0.005 |
| Open science | 0.003 | 0.007 |
| Research integrity | 0.002 | 0.004 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.005 | 0.004 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".