Beneath the Facade: Probing Safety Vulnerabilities in LLMs via Auto-Generated Jailbreak Prompts
Bibliographic record
Abstract
The rapid proliferation of large language models and multimodal generative models has raised concerns about their potential vulnerabilities to a wide range of real-world safety risks. However, a critical gap persists in systematic assessment, alongside the lack of evaluation frameworks to keep pace with the breadth and variability of real-world risk factors. In this paper, we introduce TroGEN, an automated jailbreak prompt generation framework that assesses these vulnerabilities by deriving scenario-driven jailbreak prompts using an adversarial agent. Moving beyond labor-intensive dataset construction, TroGEN features an extensible design that covers broad range of risks, supports plug-and-play jailbreak strategies, and adapts seamlessly to multimodal settings. Experimental results demonstrate that TroGEN effectively uncovers safety weaknesses, revealing susceptibilities to adversarial attacks that conceal malicious intent beneath an apparently benign facade, like a Trojan horse. Furthermore, such stealthy attacks exhibit resilience even against existing jailbreak defense methods.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.003 | 0.016 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Research integrity | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.004 | 0.002 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".