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Record W7107853480 · doi:10.4230/lipics.isaac.2025.49

Maximizing Social Welfare Among EF1 Allocations at the Presence of Two Types of Agents

2025· article· en· W7107853480 on OpenAlexafffund

Bibliographic record

VenueDROPS (Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz Center for Informatics) · 2025
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
TopicGame Theory and Voting Systems
Canadian institutionsUniversity of Alberta
FundersChina Scholarship CouncilNatural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of CanadaNational Natural Science Foundation of China
KeywordsConstant (computer programming)Expected utility hypothesisFunction (biology)Social WelfareSocial welfare functionTransferable utility

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

We study the fair allocation of indivisible items to n agents to maximize the utilitarian social welfare, where the fairness criterion is envy-free up to one item and there are only two different utility functions shared by the agents. We present a 2-approximation algorithm when the two utility functions are normalized, improving the previous best ratio of 16 √n shown for general normalized utility functions; thus this constant ratio approximation algorithm confirms the APX-completeness in this special case previously shown APX-hard. When there are only three agents, i.e., n = 3, the previous best ratio is 3 shown for general utility functions, and we present an improved and tight 5/3-approximation algorithm when the two utility functions are normalized, and a best possible and tight 2-approximation algorithm when the two utility functions are unnormalized.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.732
Threshold uncertainty score0.624

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0010.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.027
GPT teacher head0.264
Teacher spread0.237 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations0
Published2025
Admission routes2
Has abstractyes

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