Інституціоналізація лобізму в Україні: теоретико-правові засади та моделі імплементації
Why this work is in the frame
A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.
Bibliographic record
Abstract
The article examines the phenomenon of lobbying as one of the key civilized technologies of influence on the formation of public policy in democratic countries and analyzes the current state of its legal regulation in Ukraine. Lobbying in its modern sense appears as a legitimate instrument for representing and protecting the interests of various social groups, businesses, professional communities, and civil society institutions. In developed democracies such as the United States, Canada, and EU member states, lobbying activities are strictly regulated by special legislation that defines the status of lobbyists, procedures for registration, reporting mechanisms, and ensures transparency in interactions between the private sector and public authorities. Such regulatory models promote openness of the political process, reduce corruption risks, and ensure a balance of interests. Despite long-standing discussions on the need to legalize lobbying, Ukraine is still at the stage of developing normative approaches to its regulation. Key challenges include the absence of a clear legal definition of lobbying activities, the lack of regulation of the status of lobbyists, the opacity of private influence on decision-making processes, and high corruption risks. The article emphasizes that the shadow nature of lobbying practices undermines public trust in state institutions and complicates Ukraine’s integration into the European legal space, where transparency and accountability are fundamental principles of public governance. Special attention is paid to the comparative analysis of international models of lobbying regulation that may be implemented within Ukraine’s legal system. The article highlights the importance of adopting a special law on lobbying, establishing public registers of lobbyists, and introducing mechanisms of oversight and liability for violations of lobbying rules. It is argued that the legalization of lobbying in Ukraine can ensure transparency in the decision-making process, contribute to the development of democratic institutions, reduce corruption levels, and create civilized mechanisms for representing public and private interests within state policy formation.
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.003 | 0.002 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.003 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.005 | 0.013 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Open science | 0.003 | 0.002 |
| Research integrity | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.003 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it