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Record W7126218964 · doi:10.1109/raid67961.2025.00047

Evaluating LLM-Based Detection of Malicious Package Updates in npm

2025· article· W7126218964 on OpenAlexaff
Elizabeth Wyss, Dominic Tassio, Lorenzo De Carli, Drew Davidson

Bibliographic record

Venuenot available
Typearticle
Language
FieldComputer Science
TopicAdvanced Malware Detection Techniques
Canadian institutionsUniversity of Calgary
Fundersnot available
KeywordsFlaggingMalwareExploitSoftwareTask (project management)Code (set theory)PreprocessorKey (lock)Cryptovirology

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

The npm software package ecosystem is a notable target for adversarial actors, who seek to compromise software dependencies to exploit software developers and the end-users of their software. One especially dangerous form of attack involves the compromise of a package update. By sneaking malicious code into a package update, adversaries can trick package users into unknowingly installing malware. Detecting malicious package updates is an active research problem, as prospective solutions need to keep pace with the near-constant stream of new package updates, while also maintaining high detection accuracy. In this context, one potentially interesting and emergent approach involves utilizing large language models (LLMs) to identify malicious behaviors from the text of package code. However, practical use of LLMs also poses unique first-order challenges, as models are expensive to run and are known to struggle with task performance as input size increases. This work provides a critical exploration into the practicality and effectiveness of LLMs for detecting malicious package updates. We overcome the immediate challenges for LLM-based applications by preprocessing inputs for analysis and post-processing outputs for malware classification. We find this approach to be practical at repository scale and effective at detecting historical malware incidents, with our best-performing model correctly flagging 209 out of 209 malicious samples across a collection of historical attacks, while only flagging 8 out of 2,000 benign samples across a dataset of typical package updates. With first-order obstacles overcome, we then conduct a deeper investigation into the reasoning capabilities of LLMs–demonstrating specific mild code obfuscations that uniquely challenge tested LLMs and enable adaptive adversaries to subvert detection. Ultimately, our findings demonstrate nuanced potential for employing LLMs as a part of a larger security tool-belt for detecting package malware.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.005
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.026
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Simulation or modeling · Consensus signal: Simulation or modeling
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.014
Threshold uncertainty score0.029

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0050.026
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0020.001
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.001
Bibliometrics0.0020.001
Science and technology studies0.0010.001
Scholarly communication0.0020.004
Open science0.0020.002
Research integrity0.0020.003
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0020.002

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.025
GPT teacher head0.353
Teacher spread0.328 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designSimulation or modeling
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations0
Published2025
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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