Generating Malicious Demonstration Policies to Exploit Vulnerabilities in Inverse Reinforcement Learning
Why this work is in the frame
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Bibliographic record
Abstract
Reinforcement Learning (RL) algorithms depend on well-defined reward functions for policy optimization. Designing such functions is a complex task, even for domain experts. However, valid task demonstrations can still be collected from moderately skilled individuals. This motivates the use of methods such as Imitation Learning (IL) and Inverse Reinforcement Learning (IRL), where an expert provides demonstrations, allowing the algorithm to infer a policy or reward function that aligns with observed behavior. A common assumption in IRL is that demonstrations come from highly skilled experts. While some studies have explored the impact of suboptimal demonstrators, the influence of intentionally malicious demonstrations remains underexplored. This study introduces an adversarial demonstrator framework that systematically perturbs a subset of demonstrations to manipulate the reward function inferred by an IRL algorithm. Additionally, it quantifies the impact of such adversarial manipulations on the learned policy. Our results show that simply altering 10% of the demonstrations can lead the IRL algorithm to learn a faulty reward function, ultimately degrading the performance of the trained policy by up to three times the effect of adding 10% random trajectories to the result.
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Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it