Bibliographic record
Abstract
ABSTRACT Thomas Kelly and Stuart Cohen argue that intuitions about rationality provide a direct argument against the pragmatist's claim that there are practical reasons for and against belief. Although Susanna Rinard offers an insightful response to their “Rationality Argument” on behalf of robust pragmatism (the view that there are only practical reasons for and against belief), this article offers a response to the argument on behalf of pluralist pragmatism (the view that there are both practical and epistemic reasons for and against belief). I argue that contrary to what Kelly and Cohen claim, the pluralist pragmatist may adopt the very same view of rationality and all the same intuitive verdicts about cases as the anti‐pragmatist. So, intuitions about rationality can't be wielded as an argument against pluralist pragmatism. Moreover, I argue that even if the pluralist pragmatist adopts a different view of rationality than the anti‐pragmatist, they can still accommodate Kelly and Cohen's intuitions about the sorts of cases they appeal to. So, no matter which view of rationality the pluralist pragmatist accepts, Kelly and Cohen's Rationality Argument fails.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.017 | 0.018 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.002 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.005 | 0.049 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.009 | 0.008 |
| Open science | 0.002 | 0.007 |
| Research integrity | 0.004 | 0.007 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.004 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".