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Record W7132923534

Essays on Managing the Consumption and Creation of Digital Media

2022· dissertation· W7132923534 on OpenAlexaff
Yulai Zhao

Bibliographic record

VenueTSpace · 2022
Typedissertation
Language
FieldBusiness, Management and Accounting
TopicDigital Platforms and Economics
Canadian institutionsUniversity of Toronto
Fundersnot available
KeywordsCommissionConsumption (sociology)Product (mathematics)Quality (philosophy)Production (economics)Work (physics)Digital contentMedia consumption
DOInot available

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Online platforms of digitized media content face different challenges on managing the consumer demand and creator production compared to the traditional media industry. This work utilizes data from a major online book platform in China to investigate these issues and provides insights on platform management regarding content releases and creator incentives. The first essay studies the impact of the digital platform’s product release strategy of serialized media content on its consumption and the ensuing profits made by the platform. Specifically, should a platform release all chapters of a book simultaneously, sequentially over time, or with a hybrid strategy where it releases a fraction simultaneously and the rest sequentially? I show that the release speed of chapters impacts consumption through two opposite forces: binge consumption and product exploration. A slower release, while limiting binge consumption, leads to an increased exploration of other books through two mechanisms - consumers visit the platform more often and explore other books due to the constrained availability. The counterfactuals show that the platform will be worse-off under a simultaneous release strategy but better-off under an optimized hybrid release strategy. The second essay focuses on how the platform should design a monetary contract to incentivize content creators to produce higher quantity and higher quality works. The platform switched from a uniform commission rate to a quantity-based plan offering higher commission rates if a writer's production meets higher quantity brackets. Theoretical analysis indicates that a quantity-based commission plan can enhance the quantity-quality complementarity: the creators who reach a higher bracket of quantity should also produce a higher quality. This theoretical result is confirmed in multiple empirical tests. First, for a given book, the chapters published in the months when writers reached higher brackets of quantity had higher quality measured by chapter-to-chapter customer retention rates. Such a positive correlation is not significant in books published when the platform offered a uniform commission plan. Second, when writers produced higher quantity early on in a month but failed later, there was a greater quality drop under the quantity-based commission plan than under the uniform commission plan.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.000
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesMeta-epidemiology (narrow), Scholarly communication, Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.458
Threshold uncertainty score1.000

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0020.003
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0010.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.022
GPT teacher head0.265
Teacher spread0.244 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations0
Published2022
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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