MétaCan
Menu
Back to cohort
Record W7133047569

(How) do connectionist networks model cognition?

2004· dissertation· W7133047569 on OpenAlexaff
Christopher D Green

Bibliographic record

VenueTSpace · 2004
Typedissertation
Language
FieldNeuroscience
TopicEmbodied and Extended Cognition
Canadian institutionsBibliographical Society of CanadaUniversity of Toronto
Fundersnot available
KeywordsConnectionismCognitionCognitive modelParallelsProcess (computing)Artificial neural network
DOInot available

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Over the past two decades connectionist computational models of cognitive processes have come to predominate over traditional symbolic computational models. Whereas, however, it was relatively clear what aspects the parts of the symbolic models mapped on to in the cognitive domain (e.g., concepts, beliefs, desires), it has never been completely clear what the components of connectionist networks (e.g., units, connections) map on to in either the cognitive domain or some other "nearby" domain. Connectionist frequently speak of the "neural inspiration" and "biological plausibility" of the networks, they rarely concede that they are literally engaged in a process of directly modeling the neural organization that is thought to underlie cognition. In this dissertation I attempt to discover exactly what, if anything, connectionist models of cognition model. After briefly surveying the early history of connectionism in chapter l, I go on, in chapter 2, to closely examine the words of connectionists themselves on the issue of what the networks correspond to in the cognitive, neurological, (or other?) domain. Finding no clear answer there, in Chapter 3 I turn to the philosophical literature having to do with scientific explanation and scientific models to see if connectionist practices can be understood in those terms. Although I find some possible parallels in the work of semantic and post-semantic philosophers of science, a coherent account of connectionism does not emerge. Finally, in Chapter 4, I explore directly the claim that connectionist networks are idealized models of the neural structure that underpins cognition. I run several original connectionist simulations, attempting to "add back" neurological details that performance, however, it makes it considerable worse and the adding of extra computational resources do not seem to be able to resolve the new problems. Chapter 5 summarizes the complete argument of the dissertation and identifies the crucial dilemma that I believe to be facing connectionist cognitive science at this point in time.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.005
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.007
Threshold uncertainty score0.023

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.005
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.001
Bibliometrics0.0010.001
Science and technology studies0.0010.003
Scholarly communication0.0030.010
Open science0.0010.001
Research integrity0.0020.002
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0070.002

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.035
GPT teacher head0.323
Teacher spread0.288 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations0
Published2004
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

Explore more

Same venueTSpaceSame topicEmbodied and Extended CognitionFrench-language works237,207