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Record W7133105722

Decoding Distortion: Pushing the Limits of Optimal Collective Decision-Making

2024· dissertation· W7133105722 on OpenAlexaff
Mohammad Latifian

Bibliographic record

VenueTSpace · 2024
Typedissertation
Language
FieldEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
TopicGame Theory and Voting Systems
Canadian institutionsUniversity of Toronto
Fundersnot available
KeywordsVotingSocial choice theoryDistortion (music)Matching (statistics)Aggregate (composite)Focus (optics)Consistency (knowledge bases)Quality (philosophy)Proxy (statistics)Heuristics
DOInot available

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

A fundamental question in social choice theory and multi-agent systems is how to aggregate individual agents’ preferences to make a prudent collective decision. A promising line of recent work views elicited preferences as a proxy for underlying cardinal values and aims to optimize objectives based on these values. The restricted expressiveness of the elicited information makes it challenging to optimize cardinal objectives. A pertinent question arises: How close can we get to the optimal cardinal objective with only partial information?Distortion has been introduced as a quantitative measure of the quality of the output of different aggregation rules based on the proximity of their output to the optimal objective. Roughly speaking, distortion measures the worst-case deterioration of an aggregate cardinal objective given the partial elicited (usually ordinal) information. In other words, distortion is the “price” of missing information and acts as a yardstick for answering the above question. This thesis delves into the boundaries of distortion across various social choice scenarios, spanning from rudimentary single-winner voting protocols to realms like matching and participatory budgeting. In Part I we mainly focus on the distortion of single-winner voting rules. This includes investigating the limits of distortion given partial ordinal preferences, capturing the effect of randomization on the distortion, answering computational questions on finding the output with the optimal distortion, and optimizing distortion with uncertainty on the assumption on the cardinal preferences. In Part II we still focus on single-winner voting but consider other elicitation methods. This includes designing a ballot format that captures the intensities in the ordinal preferences and also analyzing the distortion of a well-known voting rule that runs two rounds of elicitation. And finally, in Part III we move beyond voting and show how distortion can be defined in a broader sense. We show the limits of achievable distortion in participatory budgeting and matching problems. We complement these results by designing algorithms that achieve optimal distortion in these settings.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.003
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.002
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesMeta-epidemiology (narrow)
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Qualitative · Consensus signal: Qualitative
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.165
Threshold uncertainty score1.000

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0030.002
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0010.001
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.001
Bibliometrics0.0010.001
Science and technology studies0.0010.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0010.000
Research integrity0.0010.001
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0010.001

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.045
GPT teacher head0.330
Teacher spread0.285 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

Study designQualitative
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations0
Published2024
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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