What was the point? Raiding in the Summer of 1917

This article examines the effectiveness of raiding by the 4th Canadian Division in July and August 1917. The 4th Division carried out extensive raiding during this period, however, the raiding did not give the 4th Division any noticeable advantage when they attacked the city of Lens at the end of August. This paper concludes that raiding did not bring any benefit for the division. © Canadian Military History, Volume 19, Number 4, Autumn 2010, pp.31-40. Jackson Raiding 1917.indd 1 1/24/2011 12:29:25 PM 1 : What was the point? Raiding in the Summer of 1917 Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2010 32 sector. Very large raids organized at the corps level using multiple brigades and battalions w e r e l a u n c h e d i n May and June as part of the Scarpe battles. Carefully planned, with the officers and men training over taped courses, these were broadly successful in the judgment of G.W.L. Nicholson, the CEF’s official historian.7 One such “ large” ra id , executed around the same time period as the 4 th Div is ion ’s many raids on the Lens front, was launched on 23 Ju ly by the 3rd Division’s 116th Battalion. The objective for this battalion-sized raid was the railway embankment in the southern section of Lens. The raid successfully reached the railway embankment where vicious fighting broke out. The Canadians succeeded in blowing up a series of dugouts a n d c a p t u r e d 5 3 prisoners before pulling back after 35 minutes. For its efforts, the 116th suffered 74 casualties.8 What useful information the raiders gleaned has not been looked at, however, as the 44th Battalion would discover a month later to the day, the formidable German defences around the railway embankment were still in place and undiminished. In practice, the Scarpe as well as the 116th Battalion operations constituted massive “one-off raids” – basically formal attacks followed by planned withdrawals. These were in sharp contrast to the more conventional “minor operations” (as the Canadian Corps referred to traditional-style raids) which were planned and executed at the brigade and battalion level and sustained day-in and dayout, usually leading up to a major attack, the nature of the 4th Division operations that are the focus of the present study. B y t h e s u m m e r o f 1 9 1 7 , Major-General David Watson had commanded the 4th Division through two major battles – the latter stages of the Somme and Vimy Ridge – as well as several lesser operations. The division and its commander fought capably in their first engagement, and also acquitted themselves rather well in the Vimy assault, considering they faced the most difficult conditions of any of the corps’ four divisions, and suffered the heaviest casualties. N e v e r t h e l e s s t h e infamous raid on Hill 145 mounted five weeks prior to Vimy, in which several of Watson’s battal ions were al l but annihilated, has raised questions among historians as to the battlefield judgement of Watson and his GSO 1, LieutenantC o l o n e l W i l l i a m Ironside , in 1917 . 9 Watson’s meteor ic rise from battalion to divisional commander in a matter of months spoke of his political connections and savvy a s m u c h o r m o r e than his operational p e r f o r m a n c e . A n outward self-confidence seems to have masked insecurities, with the result that Watson could be susceptible to pressure from above to get “results.”10 For h i s p a r t , I r o n s i d e was a brilliant young British staff officer, but arrogant and ambitious. Watson relied on the more experienced professional as a mentor, which was precisely the reason why Ironside had been seconded to the newly formed 4th Division in the spring of 1916. But there was evidence Watson, though a quick learner who was clearly maturing as a field commander, still relied on his GSO1 too much, and at the wrong times, particularly considering the degree to which Ironside’s ego and impetuosity could interfere with his own thinking. The result was that neither acted as a check on the other’s decision-making. Quite Li br ar y an d Ar ch iv es C an ad a (L AC ) P A 42 54 Lieutenant-General Arthur Currie, commander of the Canadian Corps (left) and Major-General David Watson, commander of 4th Canadian Division, both supported trench raids. LA C PA 1 35 2 Jackson Raiding 1917.indd 2 1/24/2011 12:29:25 PM 2 Canadian Military History, Vol. 19 [2010], Iss. 4, Art. 4 http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol19/iss4/4 33 rightly, Watson saw his responsibility as carrying out higher orders – if ordered to raid by Currie, he would raid, and enthusiastically and unquestioningly. His command, the CEF’s most junior division, would not be found wanting in elan.11 The 4th Division was blessed with capable brigadiers, all hand-picked by Watson. The British regular leading the 10th, Edward Hilliam, was made of stern Imperial stuff, a “fighter” but also a man whose relationship with his Canadian subordinates steadily deteriorated until he eventually had to be replaced. The commanders of the 11th and 12th Brigades – Victor Odlum and James MacBrien – were Canadians, the former an energetic prewar militia officer and the latter a regular with staff officer training and a more stolid personality. They were the only men to command their respective brigades in action during the war, leading them with distinction and much impressing Generals Byng and Currie in the process. As much or more than any other brigadier in the corps, Odlum was a disciple of raiding, having personally led many such operations during his time with the 7th Battalion, even while serving as its commanding officer. All three were personally loyal to Watson and respectful of Ironside’s undeniable talents. Overall, the working relationship among brigade and divisional headquarters was a smooth one.12 Collectively, the 12 infantry battalions making up the division were ably commanded by experienced officers, as the fighting during the remainder of the war would confirm. But all the units had suffered heavy combat losses earlier in the year, and were still integrating large numbers of junior officer, NCO and enlisted reinforcements into their ranks, a time-consuming process.13 Watson commanded in a collegial style, regularly seeking not only Ironside’s opinion in particular, but also the views of his brigadiers, at least when matters directly affected them. By predisposition, and sometimes still by necessity, Ironside exercised greater “command” responsibilities than were normally associated with his position, namely the organization and coordination and a significant role in the operational control of the division. In the raiding on the Lens front, Watson was responding to orders from corps headquarters, those generally emanating from Currie’s very capable chief of staff, Brigadier-General Percy Radcliffe. In consultation with Ironside, Watson Lieutenant-Colonel William Ironside was the GSO 1 (senior staff officer) of 4th Canadian Division in 1917. Ironside, a young British officer, was considered brilliant but arrogant and ambitious. His views held great sway as Major-General Watson relied on him as a mentor.

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