Bibliographic record
Abstract
ABSTRACTMore than sixty years ago, T. D. Weldon (1953) published an influential book entitled The Vocabulary of Politics. In it he affirmed a common belief among philosophers of language that words which could not be connected to objective, measurable objects and rendered the legitimate study of scientific investigation deserved to be dismissed as merely emotive utterances unworthy of serious consideration. They, he said, were either boo words that registered displeasure or hurrah words that expressed pleasure. Whichever they were, however, they were meaningless, since there was no externally observable referent to which an unbiased observer could appeal. They might, of course, fulfill some emotional need or communicate a personal preference; but, they were philosophically useless beyond that. So, for example, my statement that I like chocolate ice cream and your statement that you like Tutti Frutti ice cream may describe our different tastes, but they are useless insofar as determining which flavour is somehow better. What goes for ice cream goes equally well for justice, beauty and so on. Weldon argued that normative or evaluative concepts, in the absence of some basis for empirical falsification, were not worth a single philosopher's breath. This discussion paper invites readers to consider whether there is more to just semantics than that. Readers are invited to consider some of the philosophical underpinnings of what our words mean and, indeed, to ponder what might be. In fact, it comes close to asking what meaning might be. It also implies that it is incumbent upon anyone from patricians, plutocrats, prime ministers and presidents, plebeians, peasants, proletarians and even lumpenproletarians to use care when discussing politics.Keywords: democracy, essentially contested concept, meaning, semantic differential, GallieIntroductionPolitical scientists and others whose job it is to study democracy have a number of questions that they must ask and answer before their hypothesizing, theorizing and philosophizing can begin in earnest. Among other things, they must get comfortable with their basic approach. For the empirically inclined, that means that they must decide what specific aspect of democracy they want to study, from which theoretical perspective and with what methodological techniques. There are ample options. Among the potentially fruitful domains of inquiry are the relationships between democratic governance and economic, geographic, psychological and sociological variables. Social scientists of all sorts are eager to determine how democratic governance is initiated and maintained. What are the prerequisites of a democratic order? How do democracies function? What can bring them down?Democracy as a Subject of Scientific InquiryResearchers who like to putter about with the origins and evolution of democracy want to know how democratic innovations undermined and ultimately replaced authoritarian feudal regimes. This subject must be approached historically. It involves posing questions such as:* What gave rise to the English Civil War (1640-1649) and the subsequent Glorious Revolution (1688) that set the wheels of modern British constitutional government in motion?* What were the precursors of dramatic events including the American and the French revolutions?* What were the precursors of dramatic events including the American and the French revolutions?* What prompted the European revolts of 1848, and what caused them to fail?Others are more interested in the workings of contemporary democracies. Some of the many forms that their inquiries can take involve questions about how democratic governments can be institutionalized, especially in countries with no significant exposure to the far-famed Westminster Model and little indigenous experience with democratic controls on the state. Of special interest here are the socio-economic preconditions needed for formal democracies to develop. …
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.005 | 0.007 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.004 | 0.041 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.013 | 0.013 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.006 |
| Research integrity | 0.004 | 0.006 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.011 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".