Private enforcement of Art 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Traditionally, the enforcement of competition rules in Europe has been predominantly via public enforcement. Following the European Court of Justice’s ruling in 2001 in which was established the right for compensation of harms suffered by any victim of antitrust infringements, the European Commission has made proposals to create a private antitrust enforcement regime. While compensation of victims is the first and foremost guiding principle, the regime thus created, should, according to the Commission, also deliver overall better compliance with competition rules whilst creating and sustaining a competitive European economy.<br/><br/>In designing the system the Commission contends that it should not be grounded on similar features to that of the United States private enforcement mechanism as it has resulted in abuses of the system by private parties for private interests. A deconstructive reading of the Commission proposals, however, reveals that the envisaged regime contains more characteristics of the United States system than is explicitly presented. Furthermore, a direct comparison of common prohibitions in both systems exposes a significant lack of safeguards against misuse of the rules by private parties in the European system. This thesis also compares the envisaged European regime with the Canadian public enforcement regime. Despite the restricted cause of action accorded to private parties, the Canadian system is not immune from exploitation of the rules by private parties for self-interest. These findings call into question whether the proposed system will deliver the stated aims.<br/><br/>This thesis concludes that considering the costs of private enforcement, European competition law should be solely the competence of public officials. It is argued that although not formally recognised either in the literature nor in the case law of the EU courts, the Commission is already legally empowered to award compensation to victims of antitrust violations. This thesis presents suggestions for an enhancement of the current public enforcement framework.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.002 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".