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Record W95140123

WTO Dispute Settlement Remedies: Monetary Compensation as an Alternative for Developing Countries

2006· article· en· W95140123 on OpenAlexaboutno aff
Adebukola A Eleso

Bibliographic record

Venuenot available
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldSocial Sciences
TopicWorld Trade Organization Law
Canadian institutionsnot available
Fundersnot available
KeywordsCompensation (psychology)Settlement (finance)Developing countryInternational economicsEconomicsInternational tradeBusinessDevelopment economicsLaw and economicsEconomic growthFinancePayment
DOInot available

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

When the WTO came into existence formally as an institution in 1995, it was a culmination of the process to institutionalize the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) which had been in operation since 1947. As an institution with Membership of 149 countries, the goal of the WTO is to facilitate the implementation, administration, and operation of the Multilateral Trade Agreements (MTAs); to provide a forum for negotiations among Member States; to administer the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, amongst others.\nThe Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) of the WTO has been touted as one of the biggest achievements of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations. Its aim is to provide security and predictability to the multilateral trading system. It provides for a range of remedies where there has been a violation of WTO obligations. With all these remedies in place, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is actively being used in the resolution of disputes among WTO Members. Despite this however, cases generally revolve around ‘the usual suspects’ i.e. the countries that have been making the most use of dispute settlement procedures under the WTO (e.g. the United States, the European Communities, Canada, and Brazil). It is a fact that the smaller developing countries have been sorely lacking in the WTO dispute settlement procedure.\nThis paper argues that one of the reasons why more use is not being made of the dispute settlement process by developing countries is the inadequacy of the existing remedies, for their peculiar situation. The existing dispute settlement remedies are: withdrawal of the offending measure, compensation, and suspension of equivalent concessions i.e. retaliation. But it has been found that these remedies do not always meet the expectations of Members. The violating Member will not always remove the violation; Compensation is hardly ever agreed on; and Retaliation is at odds with the trade liberalization goal of the WTO and hardly benefits either party anyway. Consequently, there is an urgent need to review the existing remedies with a view to finding alternative remedies, particularly for developing countries. This paper is proposing monetary compensation as an alternative dispute settlement remedy. With the current negotiations going on as part of the Doha Round, the appropriate forum is available for these discussions to take place.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.000
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.949
Threshold uncertainty score0.988

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0010.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.023
GPT teacher head0.307
Teacher spread0.284 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations4
Published2006
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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