Notice bibliographique
Résumé
CASE DESCRIPTION The primary subject matter of this case concerns Airlines. A secondary issue concerns the appropriateness of modifying a Generic Strategy that has lead to thirty five years of uninterrupted growth and profitability. The case has a difficulty level of four (senior-level undergraduates). The case is designed to be taught in one fifty minute class period and is expected to require about two hours of outside preparation by students. CASE SYNOPSIS Airlines has long been cited in Business Strategy classes as an exemplar of Porter's Low Cost Leadership strategy. Through fiscal year 2006, they have enjoyed thirty five years of uninterrupted profitability. In 2007, they began considering several fundamental changes in their long-term business model to address the realities of increased competition, rapidly-escalating fuel costs and the threats of world-wide terrorism. New competition - particularly JetBlue and ATA have modeled their operations on the original Southwest Interestingly, David Neeleman -founder of JetBlue in 2001- was a former southwest Airlines executive and Michael O'Leary - CEO ofRyanair (Dublin, Ireland) -spent several weeks in 1991 at Airlines headquarters in Dallas, Texas learning the model. Ryanair is the lowest cost major airline in Europe at this time. Fuel prices - the second largest component of operating cost for airlines-has increased dramatically (about 50%) in the last three years. As a result, airline profits in 2008 will be lower than originally forecast in early 2007. The most common complaint about Airlines has been its boarding policy. For many years, passengers were assigned to groups of thirty with those arriving early at the gate getting into the first group of thirty and, thus, the first choice of seats. In 2007, began two experiments in seating - the first in San Diego-with assigned seats and later a differential pricing scheme whereby those willing to pay $10 - $30 more per ticket were allowed to board first. is also considering the possibility of extending its route map to include large cities in Canada, Mexico and the Caribbean. An additional consideration is the possibility of buying smaller regional jets to serve smaller markets in the United States. INTRODUCTION Rollin King, a San Antonio entrepreneur, convinced Herb Kelleher in 1966 that a commuter airline serving Houston, Dallas and San Antonio was a feasible business proposition. King, at that time owned a small commuter air service and Kelleher, an attorney, had done legal work for King. Houston, Dallas and San Antonio were the Golden Triangle of Texas with rapid economic and population growth. The distance between these three cities was long enough that travel by bus and automobile was somewhat inconvenient. On March 15, 1967, Kelleher incorporated Air Company (later Airlines) and on November 27, 1967 filed an application with the Texas Aeronautics Commission (TAC) to fly between Houston, Dallas and San Antonio. TAC approved the application on February 20, 1968 and the next day Braniff, Trans Texas and Continental filed a restraining order to prohibit from beginning to fly in the summer of 1 968. After a series of legal challenges including a Supreme Court appeal, won the right to commence operations in late 1970. H. Lamar Muse was hired as Airline's first president in January 1 97 1 and quickly assembled a group of experienced airline executives that came to be known as 'the Over the Hill Gang. Despite a series of legal challenges, Muse was able to secure financing, buy three new Boeing 737-20Os and commence flight operations on June 1 8, 1 97 1 . Because they were an in-state airline, had considerably more latitude in terms of operations than the flagship carriers (intrastate carriers). Muse came to be known as the master of the gimmick but what he was really doing was to employ Guerrilla Marketing techniques that were notably successful. …
Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.
Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier
Prédiction distillée sur la base complète
Imitation des enseignantsNi prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Apprise à partir de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Gemma. Le mode candidate est l'union des têtes enseignantes seuillées; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont ni des étiquettes humaines ni des étiquettes directes de modèles de pointe.
Scores Codex et Gemma par catégorie
| Catégorie | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Métarecherche | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens large) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Bibliométrie | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Études des sciences et des technologies | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Communication savante | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Science ouverte | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Intégrité de la recherche | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
Scores machine (provisoires)
Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.
Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découleClassification
machine, non validéePrédiction automatique; un appel candidat d’une seule tête enseignante, pas un consensus.
Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».