Bibliographic record
Abstract
CASE DESCRIPTION The primary subject matter of this case concerns Airlines. A secondary issue concerns the appropriateness of modifying a Generic Strategy that has lead to thirty five years of uninterrupted growth and profitability. The case has a difficulty level of four (senior-level undergraduates). The case is designed to be taught in one fifty minute class period and is expected to require about two hours of outside preparation by students. CASE SYNOPSIS Airlines has long been cited in Business Strategy classes as an exemplar of Porter's Low Cost Leadership strategy. Through fiscal year 2006, they have enjoyed thirty five years of uninterrupted profitability. In 2007, they began considering several fundamental changes in their long-term business model to address the realities of increased competition, rapidly-escalating fuel costs and the threats of world-wide terrorism. New competition - particularly JetBlue and ATA have modeled their operations on the original Southwest Interestingly, David Neeleman -founder of JetBlue in 2001- was a former southwest Airlines executive and Michael O'Leary - CEO ofRyanair (Dublin, Ireland) -spent several weeks in 1991 at Airlines headquarters in Dallas, Texas learning the model. Ryanair is the lowest cost major airline in Europe at this time. Fuel prices - the second largest component of operating cost for airlines-has increased dramatically (about 50%) in the last three years. As a result, airline profits in 2008 will be lower than originally forecast in early 2007. The most common complaint about Airlines has been its boarding policy. For many years, passengers were assigned to groups of thirty with those arriving early at the gate getting into the first group of thirty and, thus, the first choice of seats. In 2007, began two experiments in seating - the first in San Diego-with assigned seats and later a differential pricing scheme whereby those willing to pay $10 - $30 more per ticket were allowed to board first. is also considering the possibility of extending its route map to include large cities in Canada, Mexico and the Caribbean. An additional consideration is the possibility of buying smaller regional jets to serve smaller markets in the United States. INTRODUCTION Rollin King, a San Antonio entrepreneur, convinced Herb Kelleher in 1966 that a commuter airline serving Houston, Dallas and San Antonio was a feasible business proposition. King, at that time owned a small commuter air service and Kelleher, an attorney, had done legal work for King. Houston, Dallas and San Antonio were the Golden Triangle of Texas with rapid economic and population growth. The distance between these three cities was long enough that travel by bus and automobile was somewhat inconvenient. On March 15, 1967, Kelleher incorporated Air Company (later Airlines) and on November 27, 1967 filed an application with the Texas Aeronautics Commission (TAC) to fly between Houston, Dallas and San Antonio. TAC approved the application on February 20, 1968 and the next day Braniff, Trans Texas and Continental filed a restraining order to prohibit from beginning to fly in the summer of 1 968. After a series of legal challenges including a Supreme Court appeal, won the right to commence operations in late 1970. H. Lamar Muse was hired as Airline's first president in January 1 97 1 and quickly assembled a group of experienced airline executives that came to be known as 'the Over the Hill Gang. Despite a series of legal challenges, Muse was able to secure financing, buy three new Boeing 737-20Os and commence flight operations on June 1 8, 1 97 1 . Because they were an in-state airline, had considerably more latitude in terms of operations than the flagship carriers (intrastate carriers). Muse came to be known as the master of the gimmick but what he was really doing was to employ Guerrilla Marketing techniques that were notably successful. …
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".