Parity/Disparity: Electoral Gender Inequality on the Tightrope of Liberal Constitutional Traditions
Notice bibliographique
Résumé
(Excerpt) To force an end to the seemingly interminable war with Sparta, Lysistrata, the title character in Aristophanes’ comedy, exhorts the women of Athens to achieve peace by arousing their husbands’ desires while refusing them any gratification. This political act would force the men to end the war: “[d]oesn’t matter what they threaten to do — even if they try to set fire to the place — they won’t make us open the gates except on our own terms.” Two thousand three hundred years later, democracy and gender still have a tortured relationship. Although most democracies provided women with the right to vote and stand for office long ago, in most countries, democracy means government by, and possibly for, men. The United States’ gendered political system is typical — eighty-five years after women won the right to vote, they constitute less than one-fifth of elected representatives. Women occupy few political offices, not merely in one nation, but around the world. To combat this electoral gender inequality, various democracies with the support of international organizations, have adopted quota requirements for legislatures or political parties, ensuring that women actually participate in politics, rather than play the role of “a few tokens in political life.” Scanning women’s representation worldwide, Scandinavian countries have levels generally above 40%. Ireland enacted a quota that requires parties select women to fill 40% of candidacies. Simultaneously, other democracies, such as Argentina and Brazil also adopted quota laws, albeit with limited enforcement. Despite these apparent successes, most countries have extremely low levels of female representation — with the lowest levels in countries with Islamic governments. France had the most assertive response to electoral gender inequality, enacting the Parity Law (“Parity”) in 2000. Parity amended the French Constitution to require that political parties select women as half of their candidates for public office. French parties have to field women candidates or face fines or exclusion from the ballot. The United States, in contrast, maintains a steadfast refusal to debate issues of women’s representation. It is surprising, then, that the United States placed a quota for women’s representation in the draft constitution for the Republic of Iraq. Chapter Four, Article 30 (C) of the Iraqi Constitution states that “[t]he electoral law shall aim to achieve the goal of having women constitute no less than one-quarter of the members of the National Assembly.” Drafters insisted on this provision, fearing that: “if women are frozen out of a nascent Iraqi government, their chances of breaking through later are slim to none.” Apparently, even to the current United States administration, gender does matter in democracy. This Article seeks to situate remedies for electoral gender inequality in the context of liberal democratic theory. This Article does not attempt to present a complete argument for the existence of electoral gender inequality. However, it does presume that gender inequality, in particular electoral gender inequality, raises fundamental questions.
Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.
Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier
Prédiction machine sur la base complète
Imitation des enseignantsNi prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Le volet Gemma est une étiquette directe du modèle pour chaque travail de la base, lue sur la notice réduite au titre. Le volet Codex est un classifieur appris des 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et calibré sur les taux pondérés de l'échantillon; les champs sans appui suffisant ne portent aucun appel Codex. Le mode candidate est l'union des deux volets; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont pas des étiquettes humaines.
Scores du classifieur distillé par catégorie (deux têtes)
| Catégorie | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Métarecherche | 0,002 | 0,009 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens large) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Bibliométrie | 0,001 | 0,002 |
| Études des sciences et des technologies | 0,004 | 0,007 |
| Communication savante | 0,004 | 0,005 |
| Science ouverte | 0,000 | 0,006 |
| Intégrité de la recherche | 0,001 | 0,002 |
| Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger) | 0,025 | 0,001 |
Scores machine (provisoires)
Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.
Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découleClassification
machine, non validéePrédiction automatique; un appel candidat d’une seule source (Gemma direct ou Codex distillé), pas un consensus.
Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».