Quine versus Kripke on the Metaphysics of Modality: An Examination and Defence of Quine's Position

The aim of this thesis is to examine the theoretical commitments informing W.V. Quine’s rejection of alethic modality and to advance a Quinean response to Saul Kripke’s arguments in support of modal metaphysics. The novelty of this thesis consists in it being the first detailed explanation of how Quine’s arguments against modality are situated within his system and informed by his epistemological and ontological views and the first adequate study of the epistemological and metaphysical criticisms Quine would advance against Kripke’s defence of modality. The Quinean response to Kripke presented here is guided by four tenets that Quine takes to be central to the current scientific worldview and which he consequently adopts as the guiding methodological constraints of his own project: empiricism, regimentation, physicalism and simplicity. I explain how Quine’s referential opacity and mathematician-cyclist arguments against modality hang together with the rest of his philosophical project; and I show that while these arguments may seem unpersuasive and easily refuted by Kripke when taken in isolation, they are quite powerful when understood within the context of Quine’s entire system and seen in light of his guiding methodological constraints. By the end of this thesis, it will be clear why Quine remains unconvinced by Kripke’s arguments in support of modal metaphysics and how his response to Kripke is grounded in his deepest methodological constraints. He ultimately rejects Kripke’s arguments because they conflict with the tenets he takes to be the deepest commitments of the scientific worldview. Quine’s arguments against modality must be understood within the context of his philosophical system as a whole and are best seen not as arguments to be met by Kripke on Kripke’s terms but as illustrations of why, from the standpoint of Quine’s project and the standards it adheres to (the standards of science, as Quine understands it), modality is a flawed and unnecessary addition to reconstructed scientific theory. While there may well be reasons for rejecting Quine’s views about modality – and even reasons that would compel Quine, on his own terms, to reject his views – I argue that Kripke does not provide them.

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