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Enregistrement W1608564506

Trading up: the prospect of greater regulatory convergence in North America

2007· preprint· en· W1608564506 sur OpenAlexfundaboutno aff
Michael Hart

Notice bibliographique

RevueAmericanae (AECID Library) · 2007
Typepreprint
Langueen
DomaineBusiness, Management and Accounting
ThématiqueRegulation and Compliance Studies
Établissements canadiensnon disponible
Organismes subventionnairesCarleton University
Mots-clésConvergence (economics)EconomicsNatural resource economicsMacroeconomics
DOInon disponible

Résumé

récupéré en direct d'OpenAlex

Business (CFIB) estimates that Canadian business annually spends $33 billion or 2.6 percent of Canada's GDP in complying with this profusion of regulatory activity. 2Similar orders of magnitude in the United States and Mexico underline the critical importance of regulations to modern life and suggest the need to consider the economic impact of subtle cross-border differences. 3 Canadians, Americans, and Mexicans look to their governments to pursue largely similar goals and objectives in their regulation of the market and in managing risk.Canadians may insist that they want to remain a distinct entity north of the US border, but they also expect many of the things that Americans demand and they look to government to ensure that they get them.Mexicans have made great strides in the last two decades in modernizing their regulatory regimes and bring them up to the standards of Canada and the United States.As work at the OECD and elsewhere has made clear, competent jurisdictions seek and achieve fundamentally similar regulatory outcomes.Continuing differences are more likely to be matters of detail and implementation than of fundamental design and objectives.Nevertheless, the regulatory differences that persist and new -often small -differences that emerge in regulatory design, objectives, implementation, and compliance procedures, impose costs and maintain distortions that undermine the three economies of North America achieving their full potential.As the World Bank points out: "the cost of complying with regulations is a key determinant of a country's competitiveness and investment climate.These costs can be direct, such as capital and operating costs, or indirect, in the form of reduced innovation, investment, and productivity.Many governments are developing new initiatives to reduce the compliance costs of achieving pubic policies, which, when properly implemented, can reduce regulatory costs and improve policy results."(World Bank 2006).The regulatory "output" in all three countries may be roughly identical, but the United States disposes of much larger regulatory resources than does either Canada or Mexico; as a result, US regulatory "input" is roughly ten times that of Canada and even more than that of Mexico.Common sense suggests that all three countries can both reduce their costs and gain superior results by aligning more deliberately with each other and benefiting from much larger joint regulatory effort in selected areas, from drug approvals to environmental standards.Canada's smaller resource level 2 In its latest survey (Jones and Graf 2001), the Fraser Institute indicated that between 1975 and 1999, over 117,000 new federal and provincial regulations were enacted, an average of 4,700 a year.It estimated administrative costs to have reached $5.2 billion by 1997/98, compliance costs $103 billion, and "political" costs (regulation-related lobbying) $10.3 billion, adding up to the equivalent of more than 12 percent of Canadian GDP.The CFIB (2005) estimate of $33 billion is limited to business compliance costs.Such estimates are at best an inexact science but do provide an indication of orders of magnitude.Canada's Policy Research Initiative is looking at better ways to measure the extent and costs of Canada's regulatory regimes.See Ndayisenga and Downs (2005) and Ndayisenga and Blair (2006).3 An extensive survey of these costs in the United States has been catalogued by the Cato Institute.In a 2004 limited to federal regulations alone, it reported that: The 2003 Federal Register contains 71,269 pages. In 2002, the Register contained a record 75,606 pages. Regulatory agencies issued 4,148 final rules in 2003. In the 2003 Unified Agenda, agencies reported on 4,266 regulations that were at various stages of implementation throughout the 50-plus federal departments, agencies, and commissions, an increase of 2 percent from the previous year. Of the 4,266 regulations now in the regulatory pipeline, 127 are "economically significant" rules that will have at least $100 million in economic impact.Those rules will impose at least $12.7 billion yearly in future off-budget costs. Of the 4,266 regulations now in the works, 859 affect small business. The five most active rule-producing agencies, which accounted for 46 percent of the rules under consideration, were the Departments of Treasury, Transportation, Homeland Security, and Agriculture, and the Environmental Protection Agency. Regulatory costs are more than twice the $375 billion budget deficit. Regulatory costs of $869 billion are equivalent to 7.9 percent of U.S. gross domestic product, estimated at $10,980 billion for 2003. Federal regulatory costs of $869 billion combined with outlays of $2,158 billion bring the federal government's share of the economy to some 27 percent. Regulatory costs also exceed all corporate pretax profits, which totaled $665 billion in 2002 (Crews 2004).Mark Crain calculates that the total cost of the federal regulatory burden had risen to US$1.1 trillion by 2004 (Crain 2005; see also Crain and Hopkins 2001).

Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.

Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier

Prédiction distillée sur la base complète

Imitation des enseignants

Ni prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Apprise à partir de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Gemma. Le mode candidate est l'union des têtes enseignantes seuillées; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont ni des étiquettes humaines ni des étiquettes directes de modèles de pointe.

score de la tête « metaresearch » (Codex)0,000
score de la tête « metaresearch » (Gemma)0,000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aStatut de validation: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Catégories candidatesMéta-épidémiologie (sens strict)
Catégories consensuellesaucune
DomaineSignal candidat: aucune · Signal consensuel: aucune
Devis d'étudeSignal candidat: Observationnel · Signal consensuel: Observationnel
GenreSignal candidat: Empirique · Signal consensuel: Empirique
Score de désaccord entre enseignants0,019
Score d'incertitude au seuil1,000

Scores Codex et Gemma par catégorie

CatégorieCodexGemma
Métarecherche0,0000,000
Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict)0,0000,000
Méta-épidémiologie (sens large)0,0010,000
Bibliométrie0,0000,001
Études des sciences et des technologies0,0000,001
Communication savante0,0000,001
Science ouverte0,0010,001
Intégrité de la recherche0,0000,000
Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger)0,0010,000

Scores machine (provisoires)

Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.

Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.

Tête enseignante Opus0,023
Tête enseignante GPT0,220
Écart entre enseignants0,197 · la distance entre les deux têtes enseignantes sur ce seul travail
Statut de validationscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découle

Classification

machine, non validée

Prédiction automatique; un appel candidat d’une seule tête enseignante, pas un consensus.

Devis d'étudeObservationnel
Domainenon disponible
GenreEmpirique

Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».

En bref

Citations5
Publié2007
Routes d'admission2
Résumé présentoui

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