Paradigms and Paradoxes

A sound foreign policy must be based on the acceptance of paradox. This is true for great powers, but it is especially true for a middle power whose reach ought not to exceed its grasp. However exasperating and however irksome, there is no escaping on the one hand and on the other, even when they are not reconcilable.John W Holmes, 19701There are at least two ways we can read John Holmes's reference to paradox here. Certainly he is thinking about the way foreign policymaking is almost never easy, in the sense that there are always many implications to consider and no way to make everyone happy. But he is also thinking about the way foreign policymaking is almost never obvious, in the sense that the balance between considerations on the one hand and on the other rarely tilts so decisively toward one option that policymakers are driven to pursue a particular course of action. Diplomats and foreign policy bureaucrats stay awake at night worrying, and argue with one another about what to do, because they have real choices to make and many of them are genuinely difficult ones.Holmes's purpose here is to point out that foreign policy is complex and contingent, and therefore not amenable to being explained or predicted with anything approaching certainty. Experienced diplomats and foreign policy bureaucrats do not need to be told this; for them, this supposed paradox is more of a truism. But there are three groups that do need to hear it: politicians, social science academics, and members of the general public. Politicians and social scientists need to hear it because their way of thinking and talking about politics tends to deny these paradoxes, or at least to ignore them. And members of the general public need to hear it because their thinking about foreign policymaking is shaped by what politicians and academics say, not what diplomats and bureaucrats do. Holmes's corrective is just as badly needed today as it was 40 years ago - perhaps more so.But there is also a danger that we will over-learn this lesson and let the acceptance of paradox frustrate the effort to build up a body of theoretically grounded research on Canadian foreign policy. Canadian foreign policy as a field of study has never generated a substantial and coherent social science debate that might serve as an anchor to tie together the disparate policy areas and perspectives revolving around it - either as a foundation for more conventional scholars seeking progress, or as a foil for critical scholars seeking to uncover the power relations and political possibilities underlying the mainstream debate. Without that core debate, the field will languish and could eventually fade away as an academic project.LUMPERS AND SPLITTERSPoliticians deny the existence of paradox because those in office want to convince voters that what they are doing is obviously the best of all possible choices, and those in opposition want to convince voters that there are obviously better choices available. The governing party may allow from time to time that it is faced with a difficult choice, but then tends to pretend otherwise after the choice has been made: what was chosen was the only option, the benefits are certain and substantial, and the risks involved are known and negligible. The opposition also finds the government's choices straightforward, but straightforwardly wrong, reflecting the party's prejudices and pandering. If the government acts decisively and costs are incurred, it lacks judgement. If it seeks to compromise or hedge its bets, it lacks conviction.Social science academics deny the existence of paradox, too, but for different reasons. The essence of the conventional positivist approach is to seek to uncover the configuration of underlying factors that caused particular policy outcomes, as if the circumstances themselves would properly explain the choices that were made. The most prominent kinds of social science paradigms - structural and institutional ones - tend to conceal real-world complexity and contingency, minimize decision-makers' agency, and therefore close off questions about political and moral responsibility. …

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