The Changing Forms and Utility of Force

The Canadian forces are rightly interested in new armed actor, whether employed by Canada or by another allied country, present in its areas of operations - the international private security company. In Afghanistan alone, some 28,000 privately employed personnel provide security to variety of international clients. Numbers such as these highlight the substantial growth of the private security industry since its modest start at the end of the Cold War.1 Consequently, the Canadian forces are keen to know more about how private security companies operate, how they are managed, and how they interact with state militaries. Key issues of concern include accountability and oversight, situational awareness, appropriate rules of engagement, respect for humanitarian norms and human rights obligations, vetting, and levels of interoperability and training. Information and doctrine development on these issues are important to ensure that private companies complement, rather than overly complicate and detract from, Canadian forces' operations in the contemporary battle space.2This article's goal is to cast the net wider to consider how the private security industry may affect the Canadian forces' position as Canada's official organization charged with the responsibility to employ violence when needed overseas. This is no small issue, given the emphasis the Canadian government currently places on the forces as an instrument of policy. The forces have been reorganized into operational commands; the government has increased levels of funding and made substantial purchases; and operations in Afghanistan represent Canada's largest combat deployment since the Korean War. What is more, the government's reliance upon the forces is in keeping with the 2005 international policy statement's goals of improving Ottawa's relations with Washington. As Joel Sokolsky contends, the Canadian forces' participation in Afghanistan shows US policymakers that Canada takes continental security seriously by demonstrating a willingness to send forces overseas to participate in the forward defence of the North American homeland.3The article's objectives are twofold. First, it examines how Canada presently relies upon private security companies and why this reliance has come about. It argues that the combination of Canadian forces' manpower restraints and the private security industry's predominant focus on defensive tasks may lead the forces increasingly to emphasize the proactive application of violence. Such shift is at odds with the perception of the Canadian public that the forces are there to serve in protective roles and as peacekeepers. Second, despite the wishes of the Canadian populace, the US is likely to appreciate more military contributions from Canada that involve deployments to dangerous areas and direct engagement in combat efforts, thanks in part to the support it receives from the private security industry. The irony here is that private security companies potentially hinder such forces' contributions by draining manpower away from already-strained special forces.CANADA AND PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIESAs expressed by Conservative Defence Minister Peter MacKay, contractual relationships between Canada and private security companies have been longstanding: Private security firms have been used from time to time depending on the issue.... That is standard practice.... It has happened under the previous government and we are very judicious when we enter into these contracts.4 During the tenure of Liberal governments, ArmorGroup provided protection to Canadian diplomatic and development personnel in Kenya and the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Golan Group has supplied security services to Canadian diplomatic missions in central America. In recent years, however, contractual interactions between Canada and private security companies have increased considerably. In Afghanistan, Saladin Security, Hart Security, and Blue Hackle Security have provided protection services, respectively, to the Canadian embassy in Kabul, the strategic advisory team, and the joint coordination centre in Kandahar City. …

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