Competition in the Air: European Union Regulation of Commercial Aviation
Notice bibliographique
Résumé
Though creation of a European common market has been a goal since the conclusion of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, movement toward a single market in commercial air transport has consumed most of the ensuing half-century. While economic unification has come relatively easy in many sectors, creating a single market for air transport has proven to be a difficult challenge. The history of European commercial aviation is a colorful mix of national politics and economic policy. Although efforts to achieve regulatory liberalization were undertaken in the years leading up to the creation of the European Union (EU, or the Union), comparatively little liberalization occurred until the Union was achieved. While historically the airlines of Europe had been heavily regulated, owned, and/or subsidized by their governments, by the 1980s the European Community (EC, or the Community) began to move toward liberalization. National governments traditionally shielded their airlines from the rigors of the marketplace, perceiving the industry to have public utility characteristics. Governments utilized air carriers to promote public policy objectives beyond allocative efficiency, such as increasing tourism and foreign exchange, augmenting international prestige, enhancing national security, reducing unemployment, and promoting domestic aircraft manufacturing.This paper examines the EC/EU's movement toward air transport liberalization. It begins by identifying the various commercial air transport organizations in the EU and discusses their respective positions-historical and current-on liberalization. It proceeds by examining the actions that the member European governments have taken on the subject, and reviews how these actions foreshadowed multilateral agreements. It discusses the Treaty of Rome's competition rules and their application to the field of air transport. The paper then focuses on the current structure of the EU. It also reveals how the Single European Act was the catalyst in not only the establishment of the EU, but also the acceleration towards air transport liberalization.The paper proceeds to review the important Court of Justice cases that circumscribed the zone of application in which the competition rules can regulate air transport. It next details how the EU institutions, early on, utilized the Treaty of Rome and the Court of Justice decisions to develop the foundation for a unified European transport policy. The paper then moves to a detailed discussion of what is commonly considered the contemporary environment for commercial air transport regulation-the sequence of 'packages.' The section breaks down the regulatory environment by sector area-for example, pricing, market access, state aid, etc. It also considers the relevance of the EU merger regulations to air transport. In addition, this section discusses EU regulations of non-economic air transport issues. Finally, this chapter looks into the future of EU air transport and examines the prospectus for further liberalization, paying particular attention to true cabotage and the EU acting for the European commercial aviation market as a whole.
Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.
Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier
Prédiction distillée sur la base complète
Imitation des enseignantsNi prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Apprise à partir de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Gemma. Le mode candidate est l'union des têtes enseignantes seuillées; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont ni des étiquettes humaines ni des étiquettes directes de modèles de pointe.
Scores Codex et Gemma par catégorie
| Catégorie | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Métarecherche | 0,003 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens large) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Bibliométrie | 0,000 | 0,001 |
| Études des sciences et des technologies | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Communication savante | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Science ouverte | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Intégrité de la recherche | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
Scores machine (provisoires)
Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.
Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découleClassification
machine, non validéePrédiction automatique; un appel candidat d’une seule tête enseignante, pas un consensus.
Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».