Review: Why Leaders Lie <i>The Truth About Lying in International Politics</i>
Notice bibliographique
Résumé
WHY LEADERS LIE The Truth About Lying in International Politics John J. Mearsheimer New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. 142pp, US$21.95 doth ISBN: 978-0-19-975873-9What would be considered unacceptable behaviour in daily life finds acceptance in international politics. Most societies find murder reprehensible and punish it by law, but it remains an unfortunate and necessary by-product of statecraft. War happens. So, it seems, does lying.John Mearsheimer, famous for explaining the tragedy of competition among the great powers, adds lying to the toolkit of international statecraft. At the outset of his new book, Mearsheimer notes that it is common to assume that leaders lie all the time. This makes sense, given his every-statefor-itself view of the international system. But he ultimately concludes that lying does not happen as much we might think, even if there is a place for it in international politics. And when leaders do lie, they usually deceive their own citizens, not their international counterparts.The book begins rather provocatively by observing that, in the months prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Saddam Hussein told the truth to world leaders, but the Bush administration lied - both to American voters and to American allies. Leaders often tell such lies in order to build support for what Mearsheimer calls wars of choice. But Mearsheimer is not one to lament the use of whatever means necessary to ensure state survival and so, even though he disapproves of these kinds of lies, he maintains that lying is a vital tool of statecraft and therefore is not always bad.Mearsheimer claims that leaders tell both strategic lies in order to protect national security and selfish lies in order to protect themselves or their friends. The former - lies told for the common good - are the basis of the book. There is a distinction, Mearsheimer insists, between the lies statesmen tell each other and the lies they tell their citizens. Interstate lies are simply a cost of doing business. Lies told by leaders to their citizens, however, are potentially more corrosive, because they can backfire and corrupt domestic political and social life.International lying might seem quite common, especially in conditions of global anarchy, but Mearsheimer concludes that it is surprisingly infrequent. When leaders do lie, it is usually because they have powerful incentives to do so, regardless of the consequences. But interstate relations take place in conditions of uncertainty, so smart statesmen know that it is crucial to substantiate others' promises. When the stakes are high, trust requires verification. Leaders can sometimes trust each other blindly, but usually only when the stakes are low. But if the stakes are low, Mearsheimer asks, why not tell the truth? When there is little to be gained, why risk being labelled a liar and jeopardize one's reputation? States establish their credibility when stakes are low. When stakes are high, they put their credibility to the test.Ultimately, lying is not a big problem in international relations because all leaders appreciate that it happens in high politics. The price of lying is low because leaders cannot be expected to tell the truth when national security is at stake. Leaders know this and accept it; so should we. But in matters of low politics (which for Mearsheimer includes anything that does not affect a state's survival), the stakes are lower and so the cost of lying is higher. …
Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.
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Prédiction distillée sur la base complète
Imitation des enseignantsNi prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Apprise à partir de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Gemma. Le mode candidate est l'union des têtes enseignantes seuillées; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont ni des étiquettes humaines ni des étiquettes directes de modèles de pointe.
Scores Codex et Gemma par catégorie
| Catégorie | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Métarecherche | 0,002 | 0,003 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens large) | 0,000 | 0,001 |
| Bibliométrie | 0,001 | 0,002 |
| Études des sciences et des technologies | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Communication savante | 0,000 | 0,001 |
| Science ouverte | 0,002 | 0,000 |
| Intégrité de la recherche | 0,000 | 0,001 |
| Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
Scores machine (provisoires)
Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.
Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découleClassification
machine, non validéePrédiction automatique; un appel candidat d’une seule tête enseignante, pas un consensus.
Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».