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Enregistrement W2329259141 · doi:10.1177/002070201106600407

Review: Why Leaders Lie <i>The Truth About Lying in International Politics</i>

2011· article· en· W2329259141 sur OpenAlexaff
Kari Roberts

Notice bibliographique

RevueInternational Journal Canada s Journal of Global Policy Analysis · 2011
Typearticle
Langueen
DomaineSocial Sciences
ThématiqueGlobal Peace and Security Dynamics
Établissements canadiensMount Royal University
Organismes subventionnairesnon disponible
Mots-clésLyingTragedy (event)LamentPoliticsLawState (computer science)Order (exchange)Political scienceInternational relationsSociologyLaw and economicsPhilosophySocial scienceEconomicsTheology

Résumé

récupéré en direct d'OpenAlex

WHY LEADERS LIE The Truth About Lying in International Politics John J. Mearsheimer New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. 142pp, US$21.95 doth ISBN: 978-0-19-975873-9What would be considered unacceptable behaviour in daily life finds acceptance in international politics. Most societies find murder reprehensible and punish it by law, but it remains an unfortunate and necessary by-product of statecraft. War happens. So, it seems, does lying.John Mearsheimer, famous for explaining the tragedy of competition among the great powers, adds lying to the toolkit of international statecraft. At the outset of his new book, Mearsheimer notes that it is common to assume that leaders lie all the time. This makes sense, given his every-statefor-itself view of the international system. But he ultimately concludes that lying does not happen as much we might think, even if there is a place for it in international politics. And when leaders do lie, they usually deceive their own citizens, not their international counterparts.The book begins rather provocatively by observing that, in the months prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Saddam Hussein told the truth to world leaders, but the Bush administration lied - both to American voters and to American allies. Leaders often tell such lies in order to build support for what Mearsheimer calls wars of choice. But Mearsheimer is not one to lament the use of whatever means necessary to ensure state survival and so, even though he disapproves of these kinds of lies, he maintains that lying is a vital tool of statecraft and therefore is not always bad.Mearsheimer claims that leaders tell both strategic lies in order to protect national security and selfish lies in order to protect themselves or their friends. The former - lies told for the common good - are the basis of the book. There is a distinction, Mearsheimer insists, between the lies statesmen tell each other and the lies they tell their citizens. Interstate lies are simply a cost of doing business. Lies told by leaders to their citizens, however, are potentially more corrosive, because they can backfire and corrupt domestic political and social life.International lying might seem quite common, especially in conditions of global anarchy, but Mearsheimer concludes that it is surprisingly infrequent. When leaders do lie, it is usually because they have powerful incentives to do so, regardless of the consequences. But interstate relations take place in conditions of uncertainty, so smart statesmen know that it is crucial to substantiate others' promises. When the stakes are high, trust requires verification. Leaders can sometimes trust each other blindly, but usually only when the stakes are low. But if the stakes are low, Mearsheimer asks, why not tell the truth? When there is little to be gained, why risk being labelled a liar and jeopardize one's reputation? States establish their credibility when stakes are low. When stakes are high, they put their credibility to the test.Ultimately, lying is not a big problem in international relations because all leaders appreciate that it happens in high politics. The price of lying is low because leaders cannot be expected to tell the truth when national security is at stake. Leaders know this and accept it; so should we. But in matters of low politics (which for Mearsheimer includes anything that does not affect a state's survival), the stakes are lower and so the cost of lying is higher. …

Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.

Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier

Prédiction distillée sur la base complète

Imitation des enseignants

Ni prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Apprise à partir de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Gemma. Le mode candidate est l'union des têtes enseignantes seuillées; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont ni des étiquettes humaines ni des étiquettes directes de modèles de pointe.

score de la tête « metaresearch » (Codex)0,002
score de la tête « metaresearch » (Gemma)0,003
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aStatut de validation: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Catégories candidatesaucune
Catégories consensuellesaucune
DomaineSignal candidat: aucune · Signal consensuel: aucune
Devis d'étudeSignal candidat: Sans objet · Signal consensuel: Sans objet
GenreSignal candidat: Empirique · Signal consensuel: aucune
Score de désaccord entre enseignants0,790
Score d'incertitude au seuil1,000

Scores Codex et Gemma par catégorie

CatégorieCodexGemma
Métarecherche0,0020,003
Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict)0,0000,000
Méta-épidémiologie (sens large)0,0000,001
Bibliométrie0,0010,002
Études des sciences et des technologies0,0000,000
Communication savante0,0000,001
Science ouverte0,0020,000
Intégrité de la recherche0,0000,001
Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger)0,0000,000

Scores machine (provisoires)

Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.

Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.

Tête enseignante Opus0,028
Tête enseignante GPT0,340
Écart entre enseignants0,312 · la distance entre les deux têtes enseignantes sur ce seul travail
Statut de validationscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découle

Classification

machine, non validée

Prédiction automatique; un appel candidat d’une seule tête enseignante, pas un consensus.

Les modèles n’ont appliqué aucune catégorie : rien dans la taxonomie ne correspondait à ce travail.
Devis d'étudeSans objet
Domainenon disponible
GenreEmpirique

Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».

En bref

Citations0
Publié2011
Routes d'admission1
Résumé présentoui

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