Review: Why Leaders Lie <i>The Truth About Lying in International Politics</i>
Bibliographic record
Abstract
WHY LEADERS LIE The Truth About Lying in International Politics John J. Mearsheimer New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. 142pp, US$21.95 doth ISBN: 978-0-19-975873-9What would be considered unacceptable behaviour in daily life finds acceptance in international politics. Most societies find murder reprehensible and punish it by law, but it remains an unfortunate and necessary by-product of statecraft. War happens. So, it seems, does lying.John Mearsheimer, famous for explaining the tragedy of competition among the great powers, adds lying to the toolkit of international statecraft. At the outset of his new book, Mearsheimer notes that it is common to assume that leaders lie all the time. This makes sense, given his every-statefor-itself view of the international system. But he ultimately concludes that lying does not happen as much we might think, even if there is a place for it in international politics. And when leaders do lie, they usually deceive their own citizens, not their international counterparts.The book begins rather provocatively by observing that, in the months prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Saddam Hussein told the truth to world leaders, but the Bush administration lied - both to American voters and to American allies. Leaders often tell such lies in order to build support for what Mearsheimer calls wars of choice. But Mearsheimer is not one to lament the use of whatever means necessary to ensure state survival and so, even though he disapproves of these kinds of lies, he maintains that lying is a vital tool of statecraft and therefore is not always bad.Mearsheimer claims that leaders tell both strategic lies in order to protect national security and selfish lies in order to protect themselves or their friends. The former - lies told for the common good - are the basis of the book. There is a distinction, Mearsheimer insists, between the lies statesmen tell each other and the lies they tell their citizens. Interstate lies are simply a cost of doing business. Lies told by leaders to their citizens, however, are potentially more corrosive, because they can backfire and corrupt domestic political and social life.International lying might seem quite common, especially in conditions of global anarchy, but Mearsheimer concludes that it is surprisingly infrequent. When leaders do lie, it is usually because they have powerful incentives to do so, regardless of the consequences. But interstate relations take place in conditions of uncertainty, so smart statesmen know that it is crucial to substantiate others' promises. When the stakes are high, trust requires verification. Leaders can sometimes trust each other blindly, but usually only when the stakes are low. But if the stakes are low, Mearsheimer asks, why not tell the truth? When there is little to be gained, why risk being labelled a liar and jeopardize one's reputation? States establish their credibility when stakes are low. When stakes are high, they put their credibility to the test.Ultimately, lying is not a big problem in international relations because all leaders appreciate that it happens in high politics. The price of lying is low because leaders cannot be expected to tell the truth when national security is at stake. Leaders know this and accept it; so should we. But in matters of low politics (which for Mearsheimer includes anything that does not affect a state's survival), the stakes are lower and so the cost of lying is higher. …
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.002 | 0.003 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Open science | 0.002 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".