Evaluating the Effectiveness of the European Union Emissions Trading System to Reduce Emissions from International Civil Aviation
Notice bibliographique
Résumé
5.4 EU Unilateralism: the Case of Noise Emissions from Aviation As previously mentioned, the EU previously acted unilaterally in the field of aviation regulate aircraft noise before it adopted Directive 2008/101 include aviation in the EU ETS. Did that action successfully produce the international regime or standard that the EU Member States were looking for? ICAO noise are promulgated under volume I of Annex 16 the Chicago Convention. (223) In 1999, the EU passed Regulation 925/1999, (224) which sought to ban hushkitted aircraft which been recertified as compliant with Chapter 3 of [volume I of] Annex 16 from its territory. (225) Thus, by this Regulation, the EU attempted set higher standards for noise emissions than the ICAO ... demand. (226) This contravenes article 33 of the Chicago Convention that requires ICAO contracting States meet minimum standards. (227) Such a move would hit the US flag carrier Northwest Airlines hardest since that carrier had invested most heavily in hushkitting, rather than replacing, its aging fleet. (228) A dispute arose between the US and the EU, and, on March 14, 2000, the US filed a formal complaint with the ICAO Council against the EU Member States under article 84 of the Chicago Convention. (229) Since the EU is not and cannot be a party the Chicago Convention, the complaint was filed against the EU Member States, and not against the Union. (230) The ICAO Council denied all objections that were raised by the EU Member States, (231) but did not comment on the validity of the Regulation. (232) Consequently, these Member States filed their counter-memorial instead of opting appeal the Council's decision the International Court of Justice. (233) In response, both parties were invited by the ICAO Council's order to resume negotiations resolve the dispute, (234) and they agreed. (235) Finally, in 2001, the US and the EU reached an agreement; the EU backed off by repealing Regulation 925/1999 and by enacting Directive 2002/30, (236) and the US withdrew its complaint. (237) In June 2001, the ICAO Council updated Annex 16, volume 1, by adopting a new noise standard, namely Chapter 4. (238) Nevertheless, the updates did not ban hushkitted aircraft as desired by the EU. Even today, aircraft can be hushkitted meet the ICAO standard. (239) This can be viewed as a failure of the Union achieve its goal of banning hushkitted aircraft by its unilateral action. Is the EU heading in the same direction with respect the EU ETS? 5.5 RESPONSE TO THE EU'S UNILATERAL INCLUSION OF AVIATION IN THE EU ETS The EU claims that aviation has been included in the ETS discharge it of its responsibilities reduce greenhouse gas emissions from aviation. (240) According the EU, such responsibilities arise from the following: the objective of the UNFCCC stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere; (241) the requirement under the UNFCCC formulate and implement national and, where appropriate, regional programs containing climate change mitigation measures; (242) EU's independent commitment ... reduce its greenhouse gas emissions at least 20% below 1990 levels by 2020; (243) and the Kyoto Protocol that requires Annex I developed States pursue the limitation or reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from aviation, working through the ICAO. (244) Reducing greenhouse gas emissions from aviation, the EU believes, will essentially contribute meeting the Union's own firm independent commitment. (245) To bolster its position with respect Kyoto Protocol, the EU has referred the slow progress of ICAO processes, and the failure of such processes develop a market-based measure for international civil aviation. (246) As mentioned before, the EU ETS was launched more effectively contribute fulfilling the commitments of the EU and its Member States under the Kyoto Protocol. …
Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.
Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier
Prédiction distillée sur la base complète
Imitation des enseignantsNi prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Apprise à partir de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Gemma. Le mode candidate est l'union des têtes enseignantes seuillées; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont ni des étiquettes humaines ni des étiquettes directes de modèles de pointe.
Scores Codex et Gemma par catégorie
| Catégorie | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Métarecherche | 0,013 | 0,002 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens large) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Bibliométrie | 0,001 | 0,001 |
| Études des sciences et des technologies | 0,002 | 0,000 |
| Communication savante | 0,000 | 0,001 |
| Science ouverte | 0,002 | 0,001 |
| Intégrité de la recherche | 0,000 | 0,001 |
| Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
Scores machine (provisoires)
Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.
Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découleClassification
machine, non validéePrédiction automatique; un appel candidat d’une seule tête enseignante, pas un consensus.
Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».