Evaluating the Effectiveness of the European Union Emissions Trading System to Reduce Emissions from International Civil Aviation
Bibliographic record
Abstract
5.4 EU Unilateralism: the Case of Noise Emissions from Aviation As previously mentioned, the EU previously acted unilaterally in the field of aviation regulate aircraft noise before it adopted Directive 2008/101 include aviation in the EU ETS. Did that action successfully produce the international regime or standard that the EU Member States were looking for? ICAO noise are promulgated under volume I of Annex 16 the Chicago Convention. (223) In 1999, the EU passed Regulation 925/1999, (224) which sought to ban hushkitted aircraft which been recertified as compliant with Chapter 3 of [volume I of] Annex 16 from its territory. (225) Thus, by this Regulation, the EU attempted set higher standards for noise emissions than the ICAO ... demand. (226) This contravenes article 33 of the Chicago Convention that requires ICAO contracting States meet minimum standards. (227) Such a move would hit the US flag carrier Northwest Airlines hardest since that carrier had invested most heavily in hushkitting, rather than replacing, its aging fleet. (228) A dispute arose between the US and the EU, and, on March 14, 2000, the US filed a formal complaint with the ICAO Council against the EU Member States under article 84 of the Chicago Convention. (229) Since the EU is not and cannot be a party the Chicago Convention, the complaint was filed against the EU Member States, and not against the Union. (230) The ICAO Council denied all objections that were raised by the EU Member States, (231) but did not comment on the validity of the Regulation. (232) Consequently, these Member States filed their counter-memorial instead of opting appeal the Council's decision the International Court of Justice. (233) In response, both parties were invited by the ICAO Council's order to resume negotiations resolve the dispute, (234) and they agreed. (235) Finally, in 2001, the US and the EU reached an agreement; the EU backed off by repealing Regulation 925/1999 and by enacting Directive 2002/30, (236) and the US withdrew its complaint. (237) In June 2001, the ICAO Council updated Annex 16, volume 1, by adopting a new noise standard, namely Chapter 4. (238) Nevertheless, the updates did not ban hushkitted aircraft as desired by the EU. Even today, aircraft can be hushkitted meet the ICAO standard. (239) This can be viewed as a failure of the Union achieve its goal of banning hushkitted aircraft by its unilateral action. Is the EU heading in the same direction with respect the EU ETS? 5.5 RESPONSE TO THE EU'S UNILATERAL INCLUSION OF AVIATION IN THE EU ETS The EU claims that aviation has been included in the ETS discharge it of its responsibilities reduce greenhouse gas emissions from aviation. (240) According the EU, such responsibilities arise from the following: the objective of the UNFCCC stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere; (241) the requirement under the UNFCCC formulate and implement national and, where appropriate, regional programs containing climate change mitigation measures; (242) EU's independent commitment ... reduce its greenhouse gas emissions at least 20% below 1990 levels by 2020; (243) and the Kyoto Protocol that requires Annex I developed States pursue the limitation or reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from aviation, working through the ICAO. (244) Reducing greenhouse gas emissions from aviation, the EU believes, will essentially contribute meeting the Union's own firm independent commitment. (245) To bolster its position with respect Kyoto Protocol, the EU has referred the slow progress of ICAO processes, and the failure of such processes develop a market-based measure for international civil aviation. (246) As mentioned before, the EU ETS was launched more effectively contribute fulfilling the commitments of the EU and its Member States under the Kyoto Protocol. …
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.038 | 0.063 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.005 | 0.005 |
| Open science | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| Research integrity | 0.005 | 0.002 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.007 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".