Notice bibliographique
Résumé
1.The problem.If the topic is realism about scientific theories, particularly highly abstract, general theories, what might the question be?It is, I shall argue, unfair to suppose that theories of this kind make claims since any way of rendering their equations and principle as propositions either makes them false or undersells their usefulness.So the question should not be 'Are the theory's claims true.' Instead I propose: 'What image of the world makes intelligible the successes and failures of our theoretic practices?'The answer I propose: Nature does it just like us.Our successful theoretical practices work well for predicting and manipulating the world because they mimic Nature's own practices.I have always been a kind of Wittgensteinian Tractarian about the world; an instrumentalist about high-level theories of it; 2 and an empiricist -a prudent empiricist -when it comes to warrant.As to theory: It is best seen as a tool we use to produce descriptions of what happens in concrete situations.As to the world: There are just the facts, which involve concrete things, features, relations, processes, powers, and happenings.Possibilities are real but they depend entirely on the facts and on how Nature brings them about, and Nature, I suggest, brings them about in the same way that we predict them.As to warrant: Claims about the empirical world are warranted by the facts; and when two sets of hypotheses are supported by the same facts, the less bold is the better warranted.We use our theories to build models of concrete systems for prediction, manipulation, and explanation, all of which, when the model is successful, involve well-warranted propositions.3 The (usually complicated) propositions that describe the world as the model models it use irreducibly 'theoretical' concepts.For example, any detailed description of what happens when a laser emits a beam of coherent light will refer to electrons, photons, quantum energy, and excited states, and at some stage should employ some version of Schroedinger's equation.That secures an image of the world replete with many of the quantities, kinds, qualities, and processes named by our theoretical concepts.This makes trouble for instrumentalism.It does not seem that theory can be just an instrument, like a barometer or a pocket calculator.These theoretical terms are meaningful, with considerable evidence that they refer; and the equations play a role as equations in constructing our best descriptions of the facts.Van Fraassen's constructive empiricism provides a 'middle' way to finesse this problem: read the claims of theory literally but you need not count them true; the theory is acceptable just in case its empirical consequences are correct.1 It will be obvious how much my thinking owes to Bas van Fraassen and Hasok Chang; for concern with details, to Pat Suppes; for finding the possible in the actual, to Ruth Marcus; and for the toolbox of science, to my coauthors Towfic Shomar and Mauricio Suarez.(For this last see Cartwright, N., Shomar, T. and Suarez, M. (1995).'The Tool Box of Science: Tools for the Building of Models with a Superconductivity Example'.In W.E.
Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.
Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier
Prédiction machine sur la base complète
Imitation des enseignantsNi prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Le volet Gemma est une étiquette directe du modèle pour chaque travail de la base, lue sur la notice réduite au titre. Le volet Codex est un classifieur appris des 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et calibré sur les taux pondérés de l'échantillon; les champs sans appui suffisant ne portent aucun appel Codex. Le mode candidate est l'union des deux volets; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont pas des étiquettes humaines.
Scores du classifieur distillé par catégorie (deux têtes)
| Catégorie | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Métarecherche | 0,012 | 0,030 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict) | 0,000 | 0,001 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens large) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Bibliométrie | 0,001 | 0,001 |
| Études des sciences et des technologies | 0,007 | 0,050 |
| Communication savante | 0,010 | 0,014 |
| Science ouverte | 0,002 | 0,006 |
| Intégrité de la recherche | 0,005 | 0,006 |
| Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger) | 0,007 | 0,001 |
Scores machine (provisoires)
Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.
Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découleClassification
machine, non validéePrédiction automatique; un appel candidat d’une seule source (Gemma direct ou Codex distillé), pas un consensus.
Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».