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Record W2612173403 · doi:10.4245/sponge.v9i1.27045

Theoretical practices that work: those that mimic Nature’s own

2018· article· en· W2612173403 on OpenAlexvenueno aff
Nancy Cartwright

Bibliographic record

VenueSpontaneous Generations A Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science · 2018
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldArts and Humanities
TopicPhilosophy and History of Science
Canadian institutionsnot available
Fundersnot available
KeywordsWork (physics)PsychologyEpistemologySociologyPhilosophyEngineeringMechanical engineering

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

1.The problem.If the topic is realism about scientific theories, particularly highly abstract, general theories, what might the question be?It is, I shall argue, unfair to suppose that theories of this kind make claims since any way of rendering their equations and principle as propositions either makes them false or undersells their usefulness.So the question should not be 'Are the theory's claims true.' Instead I propose: 'What image of the world makes intelligible the successes and failures of our theoretic practices?'The answer I propose: Nature does it just like us.Our successful theoretical practices work well for predicting and manipulating the world because they mimic Nature's own practices.I have always been a kind of Wittgensteinian Tractarian about the world; an instrumentalist about high-level theories of it; 2 and an empiricist -a prudent empiricist -when it comes to warrant.As to theory: It is best seen as a tool we use to produce descriptions of what happens in concrete situations.As to the world: There are just the facts, which involve concrete things, features, relations, processes, powers, and happenings.Possibilities are real but they depend entirely on the facts and on how Nature brings them about, and Nature, I suggest, brings them about in the same way that we predict them.As to warrant: Claims about the empirical world are warranted by the facts; and when two sets of hypotheses are supported by the same facts, the less bold is the better warranted.We use our theories to build models of concrete systems for prediction, manipulation, and explanation, all of which, when the model is successful, involve well-warranted propositions.3 The (usually complicated) propositions that describe the world as the model models it use irreducibly 'theoretical' concepts.For example, any detailed description of what happens when a laser emits a beam of coherent light will refer to electrons, photons, quantum energy, and excited states, and at some stage should employ some version of Schroedinger's equation.That secures an image of the world replete with many of the quantities, kinds, qualities, and processes named by our theoretical concepts.This makes trouble for instrumentalism.It does not seem that theory can be just an instrument, like a barometer or a pocket calculator.These theoretical terms are meaningful, with considerable evidence that they refer; and the equations play a role as equations in constructing our best descriptions of the facts.Van Fraassen's constructive empiricism provides a 'middle' way to finesse this problem: read the claims of theory literally but you need not count them true; the theory is acceptable just in case its empirical consequences are correct.1 It will be obvious how much my thinking owes to Bas van Fraassen and Hasok Chang; for concern with details, to Pat Suppes; for finding the possible in the actual, to Ruth Marcus; and for the toolbox of science, to my coauthors Towfic Shomar and Mauricio Suarez.(For this last see Cartwright, N., Shomar, T. and Suarez, M. (1995).'The Tool Box of Science: Tools for the Building of Models with a Superconductivity Example'.In W.E.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.012
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.030
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesScience and technology studies
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Methods · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.993
Threshold uncertainty score0.066

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0120.030
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.001
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0010.001
Science and technology studies0.0070.050
Scholarly communication0.0100.014
Open science0.0020.006
Research integrity0.0050.006
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0070.001

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.106
GPT teacher head0.292
Teacher spread0.186 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreMethods

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations2
Published2018
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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