Bibliographic record
Abstract
1.The problem.If the topic is realism about scientific theories, particularly highly abstract, general theories, what might the question be?It is, I shall argue, unfair to suppose that theories of this kind make claims since any way of rendering their equations and principle as propositions either makes them false or undersells their usefulness.So the question should not be 'Are the theory's claims true.' Instead I propose: 'What image of the world makes intelligible the successes and failures of our theoretic practices?'The answer I propose: Nature does it just like us.Our successful theoretical practices work well for predicting and manipulating the world because they mimic Nature's own practices.I have always been a kind of Wittgensteinian Tractarian about the world; an instrumentalist about high-level theories of it; 2 and an empiricist -a prudent empiricist -when it comes to warrant.As to theory: It is best seen as a tool we use to produce descriptions of what happens in concrete situations.As to the world: There are just the facts, which involve concrete things, features, relations, processes, powers, and happenings.Possibilities are real but they depend entirely on the facts and on how Nature brings them about, and Nature, I suggest, brings them about in the same way that we predict them.As to warrant: Claims about the empirical world are warranted by the facts; and when two sets of hypotheses are supported by the same facts, the less bold is the better warranted.We use our theories to build models of concrete systems for prediction, manipulation, and explanation, all of which, when the model is successful, involve well-warranted propositions.3 The (usually complicated) propositions that describe the world as the model models it use irreducibly 'theoretical' concepts.For example, any detailed description of what happens when a laser emits a beam of coherent light will refer to electrons, photons, quantum energy, and excited states, and at some stage should employ some version of Schroedinger's equation.That secures an image of the world replete with many of the quantities, kinds, qualities, and processes named by our theoretical concepts.This makes trouble for instrumentalism.It does not seem that theory can be just an instrument, like a barometer or a pocket calculator.These theoretical terms are meaningful, with considerable evidence that they refer; and the equations play a role as equations in constructing our best descriptions of the facts.Van Fraassen's constructive empiricism provides a 'middle' way to finesse this problem: read the claims of theory literally but you need not count them true; the theory is acceptable just in case its empirical consequences are correct.1 It will be obvious how much my thinking owes to Bas van Fraassen and Hasok Chang; for concern with details, to Pat Suppes; for finding the possible in the actual, to Ruth Marcus; and for the toolbox of science, to my coauthors Towfic Shomar and Mauricio Suarez.(For this last see Cartwright, N., Shomar, T. and Suarez, M. (1995).'The Tool Box of Science: Tools for the Building of Models with a Superconductivity Example'.In W.E.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.012 | 0.030 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.007 | 0.050 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.010 | 0.014 |
| Open science | 0.002 | 0.006 |
| Research integrity | 0.005 | 0.006 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.007 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".