MétaCan
Menu
Retour à la cohorte
Enregistrement W285559923

Foreign Law and Opinion in State Courts

2006· article· en· W285559923 sur OpenAlexaboutno aff
Mark Wendell DeLaquil

Notice bibliographique

RevueAlbany law review · 2006
Typearticle
Langueen
DomaineSocial Sciences
ThématiqueInternational Law and Aviation
Établissements canadiensnon disponible
Organismes subventionnairesnon disponible
Mots-clésLawSupreme courtMajority opinionPolitical sciencePrecedentCommon lawInternational lawConcurring opinionCourt of recordSociologyOriginal jurisdiction
DOInon disponible

Résumé

récupéré en direct d'OpenAlex

Not long after the Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas, (1) I was discussing the use of foreign and international law in constitutional interpretation with a federal judge (who shall remain nameless). After a few minutes, this judge, one of the most conservative on the federal bench, said that in his court there are two kinds of authority: binding and persuasive, and that anything that isn't binding is persuasive. For instance, he could refer to a movie or other popular culture if it helped make his point. He then said that foreign and international law could be far more persuasive than law from the Ninth Circuit. The fact of the matter is that the Supreme Court and federal and state courts throughout the country have been using foreign and international law in their decisions since the Eighteenth Century. (2) Every member of the current Supreme Court who sat for a full term either authored or joined opinions that have used foreign and international law, in some way, to interpret constitutional provisions that facially have no international implications. (3) Until recently, discussions of foreign law in very famous Supreme Court cases, from Dred Scott (4) to Miranda (5) to Roe v. Wade, (6) have gone largely unnoticed. Other discussions of foreign law in famous opinions, such as Justice Harlan's cryptic use of foreign law in his Poe v. Ullman dissent, (7) are still fairly obscure. Listing every case in which this practice occurred would take far more time than we have here today. In light of the enormousness of this subject, I will discuss something that is often not mentioned: the way that state courts have used foreign law and international opinions in their recent jurisprudence. (8) While there's been much ink shed in the last two years over the relevance of the views of the world community in Supreme Court interpretation, the states have largely been ignored in this commentary. (9) As difficult as it is to construct a coherent narrative of legal trends with the Supreme Court, surveying state law is like watching Brownian motion. That said, the general scholarly consensus seems to be that foreign law is not often used by contemporary state courts, except in certain discrete areas where the substance of foreign law is necessary to deciding domestic law questions. These areas include serving process, conducting discovery, ensuring recognition of foreign judgments, assessing rights under foreign law in probate and domestic relations matters, deciding choice of law issues, and in interpreting contracts with forum selection clauses. In other words, when the courts really can't get around it. Outside these enclaves, however, state courts can and do use foreign law, representing international opinion on social and legal matters, in a variety of areas. Many state courts have used foreign laws and views to interpret and make common law, the arena in which their authority is at its greatest. Just this year, in the disastrous Naxos Records case, (10) the New York Court of Appeals cited the international community's views on whether the sale of a sound recording constitutes a publication in determining whether certain musical recordings were protected under New York common copyright law. (11) Numerous state courts have used foreign law in making and revising their tort law. State courts in Wisconsin, 12 New Jersey, (13) Louisiana, (14) and Hawaii (15) have considered the predominant view in the world that municipalities should be liable for the torts of public actors in reconsidering common law precedents to the contrary. Similarly, in the seminal case of Li v. Yellow Cab Co., the California Supreme Court cited the laws of France, and Portugal in supplanting the traditional contributory negligence system with a pure comparative negligence system, (16) and the Alaska Supreme Court cited the laws of Austria, Canada, France, Germany, the Philippines, Portugal, and Spain for the proposition that a comparative negligence system has long been used in other nations of the civilized Western world. …

Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.

Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier

Prédiction distillée sur la base complète

Imitation des enseignants

Ni prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Apprise à partir de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Gemma. Le mode candidate est l'union des têtes enseignantes seuillées; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont ni des étiquettes humaines ni des étiquettes directes de modèles de pointe.

score de la tête « metaresearch » (Codex)0,000
score de la tête « metaresearch » (Gemma)0,000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aStatut de validation: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Catégories candidatesaucune
Catégories consensuellesaucune
DomaineSignal candidat: aucune · Signal consensuel: aucune
Devis d'étudeSignal candidat: Théorique ou conceptuel · Signal consensuel: aucune
GenreSignal candidat: Autre · Signal consensuel: aucune
Score de désaccord entre enseignants0,958
Score d'incertitude au seuil0,991

Scores Codex et Gemma par catégorie

CatégorieCodexGemma
Métarecherche0,0000,000
Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict)0,0000,000
Méta-épidémiologie (sens large)0,0000,000
Bibliométrie0,0000,000
Études des sciences et des technologies0,0000,000
Communication savante0,0000,000
Science ouverte0,0000,000
Intégrité de la recherche0,0000,000
Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger)0,0000,000

Scores machine (provisoires)

Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.

Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.

Tête enseignante Opus0,021
Tête enseignante GPT0,321
Écart entre enseignants0,300 · la distance entre les deux têtes enseignantes sur ce seul travail
Statut de validationscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découle

Classification

machine, non validée

Prédiction automatique; un appel candidat d’une seule tête enseignante, pas un consensus.

Les modèles n’ont appliqué aucune catégorie : rien dans la taxonomie ne correspondait à ce travail.
Devis d'étudeThéorique ou conceptuel
Domainenon disponible
GenreAutre

Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».

En bref

Citations0
Publié2006
Routes d'admission1
Résumé présentoui

Explorer davantage

Même revueAlbany law reviewMême sujetInternational Law and AviationTravaux en français237 207