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Record W285559923

Foreign Law and Opinion in State Courts

2006· article· en· W285559923 on OpenAlexaboutno aff
Mark Wendell DeLaquil

Bibliographic record

VenueAlbany law review · 2006
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldSocial Sciences
TopicInternational Law and Aviation
Canadian institutionsnot available
Fundersnot available
KeywordsLawSupreme courtMajority opinionPolitical sciencePrecedentCommon lawInternational lawConcurring opinionCourt of recordSociologyOriginal jurisdiction
DOInot available

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Not long after the Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas, (1) I was discussing the use of foreign and international law in constitutional interpretation with a federal judge (who shall remain nameless). After a few minutes, this judge, one of the most conservative on the federal bench, said that in his court there are two kinds of authority: binding and persuasive, and that anything that isn't binding is persuasive. For instance, he could refer to a movie or other popular culture if it helped make his point. He then said that foreign and international law could be far more persuasive than law from the Ninth Circuit. The fact of the matter is that the Supreme Court and federal and state courts throughout the country have been using foreign and international law in their decisions since the Eighteenth Century. (2) Every member of the current Supreme Court who sat for a full term either authored or joined opinions that have used foreign and international law, in some way, to interpret constitutional provisions that facially have no international implications. (3) Until recently, discussions of foreign law in very famous Supreme Court cases, from Dred Scott (4) to Miranda (5) to Roe v. Wade, (6) have gone largely unnoticed. Other discussions of foreign law in famous opinions, such as Justice Harlan's cryptic use of foreign law in his Poe v. Ullman dissent, (7) are still fairly obscure. Listing every case in which this practice occurred would take far more time than we have here today. In light of the enormousness of this subject, I will discuss something that is often not mentioned: the way that state courts have used foreign law and international opinions in their recent jurisprudence. (8) While there's been much ink shed in the last two years over the relevance of the views of the world community in Supreme Court interpretation, the states have largely been ignored in this commentary. (9) As difficult as it is to construct a coherent narrative of legal trends with the Supreme Court, surveying state law is like watching Brownian motion. That said, the general scholarly consensus seems to be that foreign law is not often used by contemporary state courts, except in certain discrete areas where the substance of foreign law is necessary to deciding domestic law questions. These areas include serving process, conducting discovery, ensuring recognition of foreign judgments, assessing rights under foreign law in probate and domestic relations matters, deciding choice of law issues, and in interpreting contracts with forum selection clauses. In other words, when the courts really can't get around it. Outside these enclaves, however, state courts can and do use foreign law, representing international opinion on social and legal matters, in a variety of areas. Many state courts have used foreign laws and views to interpret and make common law, the arena in which their authority is at its greatest. Just this year, in the disastrous Naxos Records case, (10) the New York Court of Appeals cited the international community's views on whether the sale of a sound recording constitutes a publication in determining whether certain musical recordings were protected under New York common copyright law. (11) Numerous state courts have used foreign law in making and revising their tort law. State courts in Wisconsin, 12 New Jersey, (13) Louisiana, (14) and Hawaii (15) have considered the predominant view in the world that municipalities should be liable for the torts of public actors in reconsidering common law precedents to the contrary. Similarly, in the seminal case of Li v. Yellow Cab Co., the California Supreme Court cited the laws of France, and Portugal in supplanting the traditional contributory negligence system with a pure comparative negligence system, (16) and the Alaska Supreme Court cited the laws of Austria, Canada, France, Germany, the Philippines, Portugal, and Spain for the proposition that a comparative negligence system has long been used in other nations of the civilized Western world. …

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How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.005
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.008
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Not applicable · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.033
Threshold uncertainty score0.068

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0050.008
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.001
Bibliometrics0.0010.002
Science and technology studies0.0140.014
Scholarly communication0.0130.005
Open science0.0010.004
Research integrity0.0080.008
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0100.001

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.021
GPT teacher head0.321
Teacher spread0.300 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designNot applicable
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations0
Published2006
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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Same venueAlbany law reviewSame topicInternational Law and AviationFrench-language works237,207