Comparing "Appels" and Oranges: Evaluating the Link between Appeal Processes and Judiciary Structures in Canada and France
Pourquoi ce travail est dans la base
Une base qui oublie comment elle a trouvé un travail ne peut pas être vérifiée. Voici les voies qui ont admis celui-ci.
Notice bibliographique
Résumé
I. INTRODUCTION In this essay, I will attempt to explain why criminal appeal processes in France and Canada are so fundamentally different. At first glance, this is a simple question, with an obvious answer. Sometimes, however, obvious answers to simple questions can lead the academically minded among us onto long journeys of inquiry, in our efforts to uncover, beyond the obvious, why things exist or are done in a certain way. By way of example, consider that [a]ppeals ... are not a logical corollary of the exercise of judgment. (1) Indeed, as Dean Jurtas has pointed out, there is nothing inherent in the notion of decision-making which requires that every decision be reviewable by a second decision-maker. From the perspective of institutional design, the possibility of appeals--that is, the possibility of having a second person decide on the same issue after an original decision has been made--and the scope of appeals are matters of choice. (2) In other words, the simple question do appeals exist at all, or in given form? can be answered with the obvious statement different reasons that we have, institutionally, settled upon. One cannot argue with this conclusion; it is undoubtedly true. But from a scholarly perspective, it is also somewhat unsatisfying: It leaves us wondering, again and again, why? Why has a particular form of appellate law developed in a given jurisdiction? What logic underlies the choices that have been made in adopting a certain mechanism for appeals? This type of probing intellectual inquiry is perhaps most common among comparative law scholars, who, by the nature of their work, must often confront and account for differences in laws across jurisdictions. Thus, when a comparative law scholar asks why Canada and France have such markedly different criminal appeal processes, that scholar will not likely accept the obvious response that the laws enabling appeals in each jurisdiction provide for different forms of appeal. The truth of that obvious assertion does not ensure its sufficiency as a response to the question that was originally asked. My goal in this essay, therefore, is to probe beyond the superficial in order to ascertain why criminal appeals in Canada and France exist in such distinctly different forms. The first part of the ensuing discussion will briefly review some of the theory explaining, generally, why appeals exist within legal systems. In Part III, the law dealing with criminal appeals in Canada and France will be summarized. Next, in Part IV, the Canadian and French criminal judiciaries will be described. Finally, in Part V, I will attempt to demonstrate that a link exists between the design of the appellate processes and the design of the institutions of the judiciary in both Canada and France. Ultimately, I will argue that criminal appeals in Canada and France are different because the two jurisdictions train, educate, and view the abilities of judges in very different ways, and because each appeal system is therefore built around distinct assumptions about the capacities of judges to perform their functions at trial and on appeal. II. THE THEORETICAL BASIS FOR APPEALS As I have already suggested, the decision to permit criminal appeals in one form or another is, at least in Canada and France, a matter of legislative choice. It is important to understand, however, that there may be valid reasons to restrict or withhold a right to appeal, as much as there may be reasons to grant such a right. For instance, one could argue that, in order to promote the autonomy and integrity of proceedings (3) at the trial level, there should not be recourse to an appellate court for a decision on the same matter. After all, if parties to a proceeding know that any trial decision is subject to appeal, then there is a danger that they will treat the trial as a sort of dress rehearsal for the appeal that may inevitably follow, which would tend to undermine the authority of the trial court. …
Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.
Prédiction distillée sur la base complète
Imitation des enseignantsNi prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Apprise à partir de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Gemma. Le mode candidate est l'union des têtes enseignantes seuillées; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont ni des étiquettes humaines ni des étiquettes directes de modèles de pointe.
Scores Codex et Gemma par catégorie
| Catégorie | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Métarecherche | 0,003 | 0,001 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens large) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Bibliométrie | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Études des sciences et des technologies | 0,001 | 0,000 |
| Communication savante | 0,000 | 0,001 |
| Science ouverte | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Intégrité de la recherche | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
Scores machine (provisoires)
Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.
Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découle