Notice bibliographique
Résumé
Safety Cases - 10 Years Of Experience Ian Whewell Ian Whewell Health & Safety Executive Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Paper presented at the SPE International Conference on Health, Safety, and Environment in Oil and Gas Exploration and Production, Calgary, Alberta, Canada, March 2004. Paper Number: SPE-86648-MS https://doi.org/10.2118/86648-MS Published: March 29 2004 Cite View This Citation Add to Citation Manager Share Icon Share Twitter LinkedIn Get Permissions Search Site Citation Whewell, Ian. "Safety Cases - 10 Years Of Experience." Paper presented at the SPE International Conference on Health, Safety, and Environment in Oil and Gas Exploration and Production, Calgary, Alberta, Canada, March 2004. doi: https://doi.org/10.2118/86648-MS Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex Search Dropdown Menu nav search search input Search input auto suggest search filter All ContentAll ProceedingsSociety of Petroleum Engineers (SPE)SPE International Conference and Exhibition on Health, Safety, Environment, and Sustainability Search Advanced Search AbstractThe paper shares some of the lessons learned by the UK Health and Safety regulatory authority (HSE) in the 10 years since Regulations were introduced requiring a Safety Case for every offshore oil and gas installation. It highlights the strengths and weaknesses of the requirements and outlines some important changes under consideration to improve the effectiveness of Safety Cases. These may be of assistance to those who use the concept of a Safety Case in their regulatory regimes.IntroductionThe Safety Case regime in the United Kingdom is now 10 years old. Since the regulations were introduced the Regulator has gained extensive experience of Safety Cases and their role in the regulation of major accident hazard risks. At the same time the North Sea as an offshore province is maturing and creating new challenges. The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) the UK Regulatory body for Health and Safety has decided to look at the Regulations in the light of this experience to see what improvements might be made to make the Regulations more effective.BackgroundAfter the tragic events on the Piper Alpha offshore installation, in 1988 when 167 were killed following a major explosion and fire, the Cullen Inquiry was set up by the UK government to consider what lessons could be learned. Lord Cullen produced in 1990 a comprehensive two-volume report1 containing 106 recommendations for improvements to the regulation of offshore health and safety on the UK Continental Shelf (UKCS). The UK Government accepted all recommendations at the time. A key component of the recommendations was that the operator of every installation should prepare a formal document (known as a Safety Case) which described the arrangements in place on the installation for managing and controlling major accident hazard risks. It was recommended that the Safety Case should be reviewed and accepted by the Regulator, which should satisfy itself that the arrangements described in the case would ensure that risks were properly identified and adequately controlled. So important was this requirement felt to be that the Regulations2 implementing these recommendations were introduced in advance of the other regulatory changes arising from the Inquiry.The Safety Case Regulations (SCR) were developed very rapidly and came into force on 31st May 1993. There was a transitional arrangement allowing existing installations until 30th November 1994 to prepare a Safety case and have it accepted by the UK Regulatory authority (HSE). Subsequently further supporting Regulations3,4,5 were introduced implementing all the other recommendations in the Cullen Report, and replacing existing offshore specific regulations. These regulations also implemented broader European Union requirements relating to offshore industries. Keywords: regime, information, installation, safety case, society of petroleum engineers, risk management, effectiveness, proposal, regulation, risk and uncertainty assessment Subjects: Safety, Risk Management and Decision-Making, Operational safety, Risk, uncertainty, and risk assessment This content is only available via PDF. 2004. Society of Petroleum Engineers You can access this article if you purchase or spend a download.
Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.
Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier
Prédiction machine sur la base complète
Imitation des enseignantsNi prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Le volet Gemma est une étiquette directe du modèle pour chaque travail de la base, lue sur la notice réduite au titre. Le volet Codex est un classifieur appris des 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et calibré sur les taux pondérés de l'échantillon; les champs sans appui suffisant ne portent aucun appel Codex. Le mode candidate est l'union des deux volets; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont pas des étiquettes humaines.
Scores du classifieur distillé par catégorie (deux têtes)
| Catégorie | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Métarecherche | 0,037 | 0,073 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict) | 0,001 | 0,001 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens large) | 0,001 | 0,001 |
| Bibliométrie | 0,004 | 0,003 |
| Études des sciences et des technologies | 0,006 | 0,006 |
| Communication savante | 0,011 | 0,015 |
| Science ouverte | 0,006 | 0,021 |
| Intégrité de la recherche | 0,006 | 0,008 |
| Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger) | 0,047 | 0,012 |
Scores machine (provisoires)
Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.
Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découleClassification
machine, non validéePrédiction automatique; un appel candidat d’une seule source (Gemma direct ou Codex distillé), pas un consensus.
Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».