Bibliographic record
Abstract
Safety Cases - 10 Years Of Experience Ian Whewell Ian Whewell Health & Safety Executive Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Paper presented at the SPE International Conference on Health, Safety, and Environment in Oil and Gas Exploration and Production, Calgary, Alberta, Canada, March 2004. Paper Number: SPE-86648-MS https://doi.org/10.2118/86648-MS Published: March 29 2004 Cite View This Citation Add to Citation Manager Share Icon Share Twitter LinkedIn Get Permissions Search Site Citation Whewell, Ian. "Safety Cases - 10 Years Of Experience." Paper presented at the SPE International Conference on Health, Safety, and Environment in Oil and Gas Exploration and Production, Calgary, Alberta, Canada, March 2004. doi: https://doi.org/10.2118/86648-MS Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex Search Dropdown Menu nav search search input Search input auto suggest search filter All ContentAll ProceedingsSociety of Petroleum Engineers (SPE)SPE International Conference and Exhibition on Health, Safety, Environment, and Sustainability Search Advanced Search AbstractThe paper shares some of the lessons learned by the UK Health and Safety regulatory authority (HSE) in the 10 years since Regulations were introduced requiring a Safety Case for every offshore oil and gas installation. It highlights the strengths and weaknesses of the requirements and outlines some important changes under consideration to improve the effectiveness of Safety Cases. These may be of assistance to those who use the concept of a Safety Case in their regulatory regimes.IntroductionThe Safety Case regime in the United Kingdom is now 10 years old. Since the regulations were introduced the Regulator has gained extensive experience of Safety Cases and their role in the regulation of major accident hazard risks. At the same time the North Sea as an offshore province is maturing and creating new challenges. The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) the UK Regulatory body for Health and Safety has decided to look at the Regulations in the light of this experience to see what improvements might be made to make the Regulations more effective.BackgroundAfter the tragic events on the Piper Alpha offshore installation, in 1988 when 167 were killed following a major explosion and fire, the Cullen Inquiry was set up by the UK government to consider what lessons could be learned. Lord Cullen produced in 1990 a comprehensive two-volume report1 containing 106 recommendations for improvements to the regulation of offshore health and safety on the UK Continental Shelf (UKCS). The UK Government accepted all recommendations at the time. A key component of the recommendations was that the operator of every installation should prepare a formal document (known as a Safety Case) which described the arrangements in place on the installation for managing and controlling major accident hazard risks. It was recommended that the Safety Case should be reviewed and accepted by the Regulator, which should satisfy itself that the arrangements described in the case would ensure that risks were properly identified and adequately controlled. So important was this requirement felt to be that the Regulations2 implementing these recommendations were introduced in advance of the other regulatory changes arising from the Inquiry.The Safety Case Regulations (SCR) were developed very rapidly and came into force on 31st May 1993. There was a transitional arrangement allowing existing installations until 30th November 1994 to prepare a Safety case and have it accepted by the UK Regulatory authority (HSE). Subsequently further supporting Regulations3,4,5 were introduced implementing all the other recommendations in the Cullen Report, and replacing existing offshore specific regulations. These regulations also implemented broader European Union requirements relating to offshore industries. Keywords: regime, information, installation, safety case, society of petroleum engineers, risk management, effectiveness, proposal, regulation, risk and uncertainty assessment Subjects: Safety, Risk Management and Decision-Making, Operational safety, Risk, uncertainty, and risk assessment This content is only available via PDF. 2004. Society of Petroleum Engineers You can access this article if you purchase or spend a download.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.037 | 0.073 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.004 | 0.003 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.006 | 0.006 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.011 | 0.015 |
| Open science | 0.006 | 0.021 |
| Research integrity | 0.006 | 0.008 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.047 | 0.012 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".