Integrating Organisational Safety and Human Factors
Notice bibliographique
Résumé
Integrating Organisational Safety and Human Factors Patrick Hudson; Patrick Hudson Leiden University Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Gerard van der Graaf; Gerard van der Graaf Shell Exploration & Production Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Robin Bryden Robin Bryden Shell Exploration & Production Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Paper presented at the SPE International Conference on Health, Safety, and Environment in Oil and Gas Exploration and Production, Calgary, Alberta, Canada, March 2004. Paper Number: SPE-86595-MS https://doi.org/10.2118/86595-MS Published: March 29 2004 Cite View This Citation Add to Citation Manager Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email Get Permissions Search Site Citation Hudson, Patrick, van der Graaf, Gerard, and Robin Bryden. "Integrating Organisational Safety and Human Factors." Paper presented at the SPE International Conference on Health, Safety, and Environment in Oil and Gas Exploration and Production, Calgary, Alberta, Canada, March 2004. doi: https://doi.org/10.2118/86595-MS Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex Search nav search search input Search input auto suggest search filter All ContentAll ProceedingsSociety of Petroleum Engineers (SPE)SPE International Conference and Exhibition on Health, Safety, Environment, and Sustainability Search Advanced Search AbstractSince 1985 psychologists have been working to understand and manage the human factor in Health, Safety and Environment in Oil and Gas Exploration and Production. This work has led to the development of a model for organisational accidents, known as either Tripod or the Swiss Cheese model, and the development of tools for accident analysis and prevention based on that model that has subsequently become a world standard in a wide variety of industries. The organisational model was aimed specifically at systemic factors and was intended to divert attention away from individuals. More recently attention has returned to individual human factors with a research program aimed at discovering how to get people to be intrinsically motivated for good HSE behaviours. This was translated into the development of a culture of HSE and, as the Hearts and Minds program, is also supported by a variety of tools.Because the two approaches, organisational and individual, appear very different, this can lead to confusion and the belief that one set of tools replaces the other. This paper sets out the wider underlying theory and show how the two models are part of a larger approach to understanding the human factor and how it can be managed in hazardous industries.IntroductionSince 1985 psychologists have been working to understand and help manage the human factor in Health, Safety and Environment in Oil and Gas Exploration and Production. The original studies examined the structure of fatal accidents and found that, while more complicated because of the effort devoted to uncovering causes, there were no extra-ordinary reasons that differentiated fatal accidents from any others. In fact the insight gained was that the causes all appeared to be extremely predictable and were primarily indicative, when taken more than one at a time, of failures to run the business well.As will be described below this work led to the development of a model for organisational accidents, known as either Tripod or the Swiss Cheese model, and the development of tools for accident analysis and prevention based on that model. The model has subsequently become a world standard in a wide variety of industries. The organisational model was aimed specifically at systemic factors and was deliberately intended to divert attention away from individuals.More recently attention has returned to individual human factors with a research program aimed at discovering how to get people to be intrinsically motivated for good HSE behaviours. This was translated within Shell Exploration and Production into the development of a culture of HSE and, as the Hearts and Minds program. Although the Hearts and Minds program was a natural follow on from the original Tripod work, it has become clear that the existence of two apparently different programs concentrating upon behavioural factors has led to confusion in the field. People appear to assume that Hearts and Minds is a replacement for Tripod, when in fact it forms an extension and improvement, covering factors left aside in the initial work. This paper represents an attempt to resolve this confusion and explain how the two programs are related to one another.Why do accidents happen?The classical view of how an accident happens is still that one or more individuals do, or fail to do, something that is the direct cause of the accident. A train driver goes through a red light; a car driver loses control of the wheel or fails to see a child on a crossing; an electrician works on a piece of equipment that, despite clear instructions to the contrary, is electrically live with voltage; a professional pilot lands on a taxiway rather than the runway next to it. In all these cases it appears quite clear who is to blame, the individuals who were negligent or who at least failed to exercise their appropriate and required duty of care. Keywords: psychologist, confusion, wide variety, tripod, ergonomics, exploration, accident, good practice, procedure, accident happen Subjects: Health, Safety, Ergonomics, Human factors (engineering and behavioral aspects) This content is only available via PDF. 2004. Society of Petroleum Engineers You can access this article if you purchase or spend a download.
Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.
Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier
Prédiction machine sur la base complète
Imitation des enseignantsNi prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Le volet Gemma est une étiquette directe du modèle pour chaque travail de la base, lue sur la notice réduite au titre. Le volet Codex est un classifieur appris des 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et calibré sur les taux pondérés de l'échantillon; les champs sans appui suffisant ne portent aucun appel Codex. Le mode candidate est l'union des deux volets; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont pas des étiquettes humaines.
Scores du classifieur distillé par catégorie (deux têtes)
| Catégorie | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Métarecherche | 0,013 | 0,037 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict) | 0,001 | 0,001 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens large) | 0,001 | 0,001 |
| Bibliométrie | 0,006 | 0,003 |
| Études des sciences et des technologies | 0,003 | 0,006 |
| Communication savante | 0,015 | 0,011 |
| Science ouverte | 0,001 | 0,012 |
| Intégrité de la recherche | 0,003 | 0,003 |
| Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger) | 0,013 | 0,003 |
Scores machine (provisoires)
Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.
Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découleClassification
machine, non validéePrédiction automatique; un appel candidat d’une seule source (Gemma direct ou Codex distillé), pas un consensus.
Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».