Integrating Organisational Safety and Human Factors
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Integrating Organisational Safety and Human Factors Patrick Hudson; Patrick Hudson Leiden University Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Gerard van der Graaf; Gerard van der Graaf Shell Exploration & Production Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Robin Bryden Robin Bryden Shell Exploration & Production Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Paper presented at the SPE International Conference on Health, Safety, and Environment in Oil and Gas Exploration and Production, Calgary, Alberta, Canada, March 2004. Paper Number: SPE-86595-MS https://doi.org/10.2118/86595-MS Published: March 29 2004 Cite View This Citation Add to Citation Manager Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email Get Permissions Search Site Citation Hudson, Patrick, van der Graaf, Gerard, and Robin Bryden. "Integrating Organisational Safety and Human Factors." Paper presented at the SPE International Conference on Health, Safety, and Environment in Oil and Gas Exploration and Production, Calgary, Alberta, Canada, March 2004. doi: https://doi.org/10.2118/86595-MS Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex Search nav search search input Search input auto suggest search filter All ContentAll ProceedingsSociety of Petroleum Engineers (SPE)SPE International Conference and Exhibition on Health, Safety, Environment, and Sustainability Search Advanced Search AbstractSince 1985 psychologists have been working to understand and manage the human factor in Health, Safety and Environment in Oil and Gas Exploration and Production. This work has led to the development of a model for organisational accidents, known as either Tripod or the Swiss Cheese model, and the development of tools for accident analysis and prevention based on that model that has subsequently become a world standard in a wide variety of industries. The organisational model was aimed specifically at systemic factors and was intended to divert attention away from individuals. More recently attention has returned to individual human factors with a research program aimed at discovering how to get people to be intrinsically motivated for good HSE behaviours. This was translated into the development of a culture of HSE and, as the Hearts and Minds program, is also supported by a variety of tools.Because the two approaches, organisational and individual, appear very different, this can lead to confusion and the belief that one set of tools replaces the other. This paper sets out the wider underlying theory and show how the two models are part of a larger approach to understanding the human factor and how it can be managed in hazardous industries.IntroductionSince 1985 psychologists have been working to understand and help manage the human factor in Health, Safety and Environment in Oil and Gas Exploration and Production. The original studies examined the structure of fatal accidents and found that, while more complicated because of the effort devoted to uncovering causes, there were no extra-ordinary reasons that differentiated fatal accidents from any others. In fact the insight gained was that the causes all appeared to be extremely predictable and were primarily indicative, when taken more than one at a time, of failures to run the business well.As will be described below this work led to the development of a model for organisational accidents, known as either Tripod or the Swiss Cheese model, and the development of tools for accident analysis and prevention based on that model. The model has subsequently become a world standard in a wide variety of industries. The organisational model was aimed specifically at systemic factors and was deliberately intended to divert attention away from individuals.More recently attention has returned to individual human factors with a research program aimed at discovering how to get people to be intrinsically motivated for good HSE behaviours. This was translated within Shell Exploration and Production into the development of a culture of HSE and, as the Hearts and Minds program. Although the Hearts and Minds program was a natural follow on from the original Tripod work, it has become clear that the existence of two apparently different programs concentrating upon behavioural factors has led to confusion in the field. People appear to assume that Hearts and Minds is a replacement for Tripod, when in fact it forms an extension and improvement, covering factors left aside in the initial work. This paper represents an attempt to resolve this confusion and explain how the two programs are related to one another.Why do accidents happen?The classical view of how an accident happens is still that one or more individuals do, or fail to do, something that is the direct cause of the accident. A train driver goes through a red light; a car driver loses control of the wheel or fails to see a child on a crossing; an electrician works on a piece of equipment that, despite clear instructions to the contrary, is electrically live with voltage; a professional pilot lands on a taxiway rather than the runway next to it. In all these cases it appears quite clear who is to blame, the individuals who were negligent or who at least failed to exercise their appropriate and required duty of care. Keywords: psychologist, confusion, wide variety, tripod, ergonomics, exploration, accident, good practice, procedure, accident happen Subjects: Health, Safety, Ergonomics, Human factors (engineering and behavioral aspects) This content is only available via PDF. 2004. Society of Petroleum Engineers You can access this article if you purchase or spend a download.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.013 | 0.037 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.006 | 0.003 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.003 | 0.006 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.015 | 0.011 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.012 |
| Research integrity | 0.003 | 0.003 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.013 | 0.003 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".