Notice bibliographique
Résumé
In this well-researched book, the author explores the complex commercial relationship between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and capitalist countries during the period from the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–45) to the later years of Mao Zedong's rule (1949–76). The focus is on the CCP leadership, including Mao himself, the trade bureaucracy, particularly the Ministry of International Trade, and their foreign counterparts. The book reveals that during much of this time, China cultivated trade relations with capitalist countries abroad while simultaneously promoting anti-capitalist revolutions domestically.The book consists of seven chronological chapters. Chapter 1 discusses the period of the Second Sino-Japanese War and its aftermath, highlighting the CCP's use of colonial Hong Kong as a secret trading hub between CCP-controlled parts of China and foreign countries. After Japan's defeat, the CCP expanded into northern Manchuria and attempted to develop a trade route connecting it to Hong Kong. In chapter 2, the author reveals that following their victory over the Nationalists in the Civil War, the CCP sought to maintain trade not only with the Soviet Union but also with capitalist countries. Confronted with the challenges of controlling China's largest cities, the CCP endeavored to preserve trade relations with market economies.Chapter 3 explores the impact of China's entry into the Korean War in October 1950. The United States responded with a more restrictive embargo on China than on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. To circumvent this “China differential,” the PRC persisted in trading via Hong Kong and utilized the 1952 Moscow Conference and other platforms to condemn the US embargo. Chapter 4 shows that during the mid-1950s, China endeavored to portray itself as an open, cooperative power. Although the majority of Chinese trade at the time was with socialist countries, trade with capitalist nations continued, exemplified by trade fairs held at the Canton Exhibition Hall. The demise of the “China differential” further encouraged capitalist trade.Chapter 5 examines the Great Leap Forward's (1958–62) repercussions on trade. The era's radical politics promoted an unrealistic expansion of trade. The decentralization of bureaucratic organizations like the Ministry of Foreign Trade caused chaos. Chapter 6 details the consequences of the economic crisis, particularly the food shortage, caused by the Great Leap Forward. With the Sino-Soviet Split, PRC leaders considered importing grains from capitalist countries. In 1960 and 1961, China imported a substantial amount of grain primarily from Australia and Canada. Furthermore, trade relations with capitalist nations continued and expanded after the food shortage, leading China to trade more with capitalist countries than socialist ones.Chapter 7 investigates the Cultural Revolution period. The early phase's excessive political campaigns damaged some Ministry of Foreign Trade officials, but the new environment, partly facilitated by Sino-US rapprochement, allowed the PRC to further develop trade with capitalist countries. A significant milestone was the 1973 Four-Three Program, which involved importing USD 4.3 billion worth of complete plants and factory facilities from countries. These projects persisted into the early Deng period. The epilogue considers how decades of experimentation during the Mao period laid the groundwork for Deng Xiaoping's reform and opening up.Maoist China's economic relations with nonsocialist economies is a new and promising topic.1 Focusing on the Mao period to discuss the “origins” of Deng's reform is a relatively novel approach. Much of the past scholarship on the continuities between the Mao and Deng eras was made by social scientists who focused on the Deng period to explore the “legacies” of the Mao era.2While the book has many merits, the reviewer was particularly impressed by the author's meticulous and nuanced depiction of the evolution of the CCP's thinking on international trade. The author explains that international trade always served political ends and that the CCP always harbored suspicions about unchecked markets posing existential threats to the Chinese revolution (6). However, senior economic officials in Beijing and Chinese trade officials overseas gradually reconciled the PRC's socialist identity with the reality of their need for foreign trade, culminating in the Four-Three Program in the early 1970s. The author's depiction of subtle and not-so-subtle changes in Mao and other CCP leaders’ thinking on capitalist trade is worth praise.Such nuanced discussion is based on a rich array of Chinese and foreign archives. The author utilizes a wealth of newly accessible Chinese archives, including the Foreign Ministry Archives in Beijing and various provincial-level archives, to showcase the internal discussions among PRC leaders and bureaucrats as well as the day-to-day operations of capitalist trade. It is worth noting that many of the documents cited in the book were reclassified afterward, which further increases the value of the book. These Chinese sources are complemented by archives from the United States, United Kingdom, and Japan, with the UK Foreign Ministry archives offering particularly valuable insights on both the PRC and British colonial Hong Kong.Some readers might be curious to know about the relationship between trade with capitalist and socialist countries. As the author notes (50–52), the PRC's trade patterns with the Soviet Union during the 1950s and with capitalist countries exhibit some similarities. For instance, the PRC imported machines and factory equipment from both sources in the Sino-Soviet cooperation during the First Five-Year Plan and the Four-Three Program with capitalist countries. Furthermore, a meaningful comparison may possibly be made between the late Mao-era China and the Soviet Union during the 1920s and 1930s, which imported technologies from capitalist countries to industrialize.3 Further examinations of these similarities, as well as differences, could offer valuable insights into China's trade dynamics at the time.Posing new findings and questions, this is a very important book for anyone interested in the history of Mao-era China's foreign relations and economy. Given the significance of the Chinese economy in the world today, the book will also intrigue people who are interested in the global economy during the Cold War.
Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.
Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier
Prédiction distillée sur la base complète
Imitation des enseignantsNi prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Apprise à partir de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Gemma. Le mode candidate est l'union des têtes enseignantes seuillées; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont ni des étiquettes humaines ni des étiquettes directes de modèles de pointe.
Scores Codex et Gemma par catégorie
| Catégorie | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Métarecherche | 0,003 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens large) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Bibliométrie | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Études des sciences et des technologies | 0,001 | 0,001 |
| Communication savante | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Science ouverte | 0,001 | 0,000 |
| Intégrité de la recherche | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
Scores machine (provisoires)
Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.
Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découleClassification
machine, non validéePrédiction automatique; un appel candidat d’une seule tête enseignante, pas un consensus.
Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».