Bibliographic record
Abstract
In this well-researched book, the author explores the complex commercial relationship between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and capitalist countries during the period from the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–45) to the later years of Mao Zedong's rule (1949–76). The focus is on the CCP leadership, including Mao himself, the trade bureaucracy, particularly the Ministry of International Trade, and their foreign counterparts. The book reveals that during much of this time, China cultivated trade relations with capitalist countries abroad while simultaneously promoting anti-capitalist revolutions domestically.The book consists of seven chronological chapters. Chapter 1 discusses the period of the Second Sino-Japanese War and its aftermath, highlighting the CCP's use of colonial Hong Kong as a secret trading hub between CCP-controlled parts of China and foreign countries. After Japan's defeat, the CCP expanded into northern Manchuria and attempted to develop a trade route connecting it to Hong Kong. In chapter 2, the author reveals that following their victory over the Nationalists in the Civil War, the CCP sought to maintain trade not only with the Soviet Union but also with capitalist countries. Confronted with the challenges of controlling China's largest cities, the CCP endeavored to preserve trade relations with market economies.Chapter 3 explores the impact of China's entry into the Korean War in October 1950. The United States responded with a more restrictive embargo on China than on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. To circumvent this “China differential,” the PRC persisted in trading via Hong Kong and utilized the 1952 Moscow Conference and other platforms to condemn the US embargo. Chapter 4 shows that during the mid-1950s, China endeavored to portray itself as an open, cooperative power. Although the majority of Chinese trade at the time was with socialist countries, trade with capitalist nations continued, exemplified by trade fairs held at the Canton Exhibition Hall. The demise of the “China differential” further encouraged capitalist trade.Chapter 5 examines the Great Leap Forward's (1958–62) repercussions on trade. The era's radical politics promoted an unrealistic expansion of trade. The decentralization of bureaucratic organizations like the Ministry of Foreign Trade caused chaos. Chapter 6 details the consequences of the economic crisis, particularly the food shortage, caused by the Great Leap Forward. With the Sino-Soviet Split, PRC leaders considered importing grains from capitalist countries. In 1960 and 1961, China imported a substantial amount of grain primarily from Australia and Canada. Furthermore, trade relations with capitalist nations continued and expanded after the food shortage, leading China to trade more with capitalist countries than socialist ones.Chapter 7 investigates the Cultural Revolution period. The early phase's excessive political campaigns damaged some Ministry of Foreign Trade officials, but the new environment, partly facilitated by Sino-US rapprochement, allowed the PRC to further develop trade with capitalist countries. A significant milestone was the 1973 Four-Three Program, which involved importing USD 4.3 billion worth of complete plants and factory facilities from countries. These projects persisted into the early Deng period. The epilogue considers how decades of experimentation during the Mao period laid the groundwork for Deng Xiaoping's reform and opening up.Maoist China's economic relations with nonsocialist economies is a new and promising topic.1 Focusing on the Mao period to discuss the “origins” of Deng's reform is a relatively novel approach. Much of the past scholarship on the continuities between the Mao and Deng eras was made by social scientists who focused on the Deng period to explore the “legacies” of the Mao era.2While the book has many merits, the reviewer was particularly impressed by the author's meticulous and nuanced depiction of the evolution of the CCP's thinking on international trade. The author explains that international trade always served political ends and that the CCP always harbored suspicions about unchecked markets posing existential threats to the Chinese revolution (6). However, senior economic officials in Beijing and Chinese trade officials overseas gradually reconciled the PRC's socialist identity with the reality of their need for foreign trade, culminating in the Four-Three Program in the early 1970s. The author's depiction of subtle and not-so-subtle changes in Mao and other CCP leaders’ thinking on capitalist trade is worth praise.Such nuanced discussion is based on a rich array of Chinese and foreign archives. The author utilizes a wealth of newly accessible Chinese archives, including the Foreign Ministry Archives in Beijing and various provincial-level archives, to showcase the internal discussions among PRC leaders and bureaucrats as well as the day-to-day operations of capitalist trade. It is worth noting that many of the documents cited in the book were reclassified afterward, which further increases the value of the book. These Chinese sources are complemented by archives from the United States, United Kingdom, and Japan, with the UK Foreign Ministry archives offering particularly valuable insights on both the PRC and British colonial Hong Kong.Some readers might be curious to know about the relationship between trade with capitalist and socialist countries. As the author notes (50–52), the PRC's trade patterns with the Soviet Union during the 1950s and with capitalist countries exhibit some similarities. For instance, the PRC imported machines and factory equipment from both sources in the Sino-Soviet cooperation during the First Five-Year Plan and the Four-Three Program with capitalist countries. Furthermore, a meaningful comparison may possibly be made between the late Mao-era China and the Soviet Union during the 1920s and 1930s, which imported technologies from capitalist countries to industrialize.3 Further examinations of these similarities, as well as differences, could offer valuable insights into China's trade dynamics at the time.Posing new findings and questions, this is a very important book for anyone interested in the history of Mao-era China's foreign relations and economy. Given the significance of the Chinese economy in the world today, the book will also intrigue people who are interested in the global economy during the Cold War.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.003 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".