Notice bibliographique
Résumé
Dalton McGuinty, Premier of Ontario fulfilled a campaign promise by announcing the creation of the Ontario Citizens' Assembly on Electoral Reform.The purpose of the Citizens' Assembly was to examine and make recommendations for reforming Ontario's electoral system.After eight months of deliberation, the final report of the Citizens' Assembly recommended that Ontario adopt a Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) electoral system, instead of maintaining a Single Member Plurality (SMP) electoral system.As a result of this recommendation, a referendum was called concurrently with the province's general election to give Ontarians the opportunity to either adopt the Citizens' Assembly's proposal or maintain the status quo.On October 10, 2007 Ontarians decisively rejected the Citizens' Assembly's recommendation thereby defeating the attempt at reforming the province's electoral system.Electoral reform failed in the province of Ontario due to apathy amongst the province's electorate, partisan self-interest and a lack of information regarding the referendum.To understand how these aspects form the basis for its defeat it is necessary to provide an overview of: (i) the climate in which electoral reform developed at the federal and provincial levels across Canada; (ii) the emergence of electoral reform in Ontario; and (iii) the work conducted by the Ontario Citizens' Assembly on Electoral Reform. I. ELECTORAL REFORM IN CANADAElectoral reform became a significant issue in the early part of the 1990s, as Canada was gripped with "a democratic malaise evidenced by decreasing levels of political trust, declining voter turnout, increasing J.D. (2014) O 138 MANITOBA LAW JOURNAL VOL 36|NO 2 cynicism towards politicians and traditional forms of political participation, and growing disengagement of young people from politics." 1 Electoral results both federally and provincially began to trouble Canadians' sense of fairness and legitimacy, as many felt the outcomes did not represent their choice.Instead of being acclaimed for its strengths of producing accountable and stable majority governments, the SMP electoral system was assailed for its inability to produce representative governments. A. Federal LevelThe 1993 federal election saw massive upheaval in the federal political sphere as "the virtual destruction of one of Canada's two major political parties ushered in a period of effective one party dominance" 2 of the Liberal Party.Along with this dominance, regionalism grew as citizens in Western Canada and Quebec opted to support regionally based parties in the belief that they would be better represented in Ottawa.This included the Reform Party and its predecessor the Canadian Alliance in Western Canada and the Bloc Québécois in Quebec.As the decade progressed, it became evident that electoral results produced in 1993 were not extraordinary, but rather the new standard as they were largely replicated in the 1997 and 2000 elections.The electorate became increasingly frustrated with the SMP electoral system, as they felt the results no longer reflected the desires of Canadians.One aspect that concerned the electorate was the SMP electoral system producing "artificially swollen legislative majorities", 3 which allowed the Liberal Party to dominate Canada's political agenda for over a decade.Although the Liberal Party only received 41.30%, 38.50% and 40.80% of the popular vote in the 1993, 1997 and 2000 elections, they won 60%, 52%, and 57% of the seats in the House of Commons respectively.41
Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.
Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier
Prédiction machine sur la base complète
Imitation des enseignantsNi prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Le volet Gemma est une étiquette directe du modèle pour chaque travail de la base, lue sur la notice réduite au titre. Le volet Codex est un classifieur appris des 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et calibré sur les taux pondérés de l'échantillon; les champs sans appui suffisant ne portent aucun appel Codex. Le mode candidate est l'union des deux volets; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont pas des étiquettes humaines.
Scores du classifieur distillé par catégorie (deux têtes)
| Catégorie | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Métarecherche | 0,004 | 0,010 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict) | 0,000 | 0,001 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens large) | 0,000 | 0,001 |
| Bibliométrie | 0,002 | 0,004 |
| Études des sciences et des technologies | 0,031 | 0,011 |
| Communication savante | 0,007 | 0,002 |
| Science ouverte | 0,002 | 0,004 |
| Intégrité de la recherche | 0,003 | 0,003 |
| Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger) | 0,013 | 0,001 |
Scores machine (provisoires)
Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.
Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découleClassification
machine, non validéePrédiction automatique; un appel candidat d’une seule source (Gemma direct ou Codex distillé), pas un consensus.
Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».