Bibliographic record
Abstract
Dalton McGuinty, Premier of Ontario fulfilled a campaign promise by announcing the creation of the Ontario Citizens' Assembly on Electoral Reform.The purpose of the Citizens' Assembly was to examine and make recommendations for reforming Ontario's electoral system.After eight months of deliberation, the final report of the Citizens' Assembly recommended that Ontario adopt a Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) electoral system, instead of maintaining a Single Member Plurality (SMP) electoral system.As a result of this recommendation, a referendum was called concurrently with the province's general election to give Ontarians the opportunity to either adopt the Citizens' Assembly's proposal or maintain the status quo.On October 10, 2007 Ontarians decisively rejected the Citizens' Assembly's recommendation thereby defeating the attempt at reforming the province's electoral system.Electoral reform failed in the province of Ontario due to apathy amongst the province's electorate, partisan self-interest and a lack of information regarding the referendum.To understand how these aspects form the basis for its defeat it is necessary to provide an overview of: (i) the climate in which electoral reform developed at the federal and provincial levels across Canada; (ii) the emergence of electoral reform in Ontario; and (iii) the work conducted by the Ontario Citizens' Assembly on Electoral Reform. I. ELECTORAL REFORM IN CANADAElectoral reform became a significant issue in the early part of the 1990s, as Canada was gripped with "a democratic malaise evidenced by decreasing levels of political trust, declining voter turnout, increasing J.D. (2014) O 138 MANITOBA LAW JOURNAL VOL 36|NO 2 cynicism towards politicians and traditional forms of political participation, and growing disengagement of young people from politics." 1 Electoral results both federally and provincially began to trouble Canadians' sense of fairness and legitimacy, as many felt the outcomes did not represent their choice.Instead of being acclaimed for its strengths of producing accountable and stable majority governments, the SMP electoral system was assailed for its inability to produce representative governments. A. Federal LevelThe 1993 federal election saw massive upheaval in the federal political sphere as "the virtual destruction of one of Canada's two major political parties ushered in a period of effective one party dominance" 2 of the Liberal Party.Along with this dominance, regionalism grew as citizens in Western Canada and Quebec opted to support regionally based parties in the belief that they would be better represented in Ottawa.This included the Reform Party and its predecessor the Canadian Alliance in Western Canada and the Bloc Québécois in Quebec.As the decade progressed, it became evident that electoral results produced in 1993 were not extraordinary, but rather the new standard as they were largely replicated in the 1997 and 2000 elections.The electorate became increasingly frustrated with the SMP electoral system, as they felt the results no longer reflected the desires of Canadians.One aspect that concerned the electorate was the SMP electoral system producing "artificially swollen legislative majorities", 3 which allowed the Liberal Party to dominate Canada's political agenda for over a decade.Although the Liberal Party only received 41.30%, 38.50% and 40.80% of the popular vote in the 1993, 1997 and 2000 elections, they won 60%, 52%, and 57% of the seats in the House of Commons respectively.41
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.004 | 0.010 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.002 | 0.004 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.031 | 0.011 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.007 | 0.002 |
| Open science | 0.002 | 0.004 |
| Research integrity | 0.003 | 0.003 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.013 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".